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Abstract
Let X be a set of social alternatives, and let V be a set of ‘votes’ or ‘signals’. (We
do not assume any structure on X or V). A variable population voting rule F takes
any number of anonymous votes drawn from V as input, and produces a nonempty
subset of X as output. The rule F satisfies reinforcement if, whenever two disjoint
sets of voters independently select some subset Y ⊆ X , the union of these two sets
will also select Y. We show that F satisfies reinforcement if and only if F is a balance
rule. If F satisfies a form of neutrality, then F is satisfies reinforcement if and only if
F is a scoring rule (with scores taking values in an abstract linearly ordered abelian
group R); this generalizes a result of Myerson (1995). We also discuss the sense in
which the balance or scoring representation of F is unique. Finally, we provide a
characterization of two scoring rules: formally utilitarian voting and range voting.
1 Introduction
Suppose a group of voters must collectively choose some policy from a set of alternatives,
using a voting rule F . Suppose we split the voters into two subgroups, and each subgroup,
using rule F , selects the alternative x. Then it seems desirable that the combined group,
using F , should also select alternative x. We say the rule F satisfies reinforcement1 if it
has this property. Smith (1973) and Young (1974b, 1975) showed that ‘scoring rules’ are
the only preference aggregation rules2 which satisfy reinforcement and are anonymous and
neutral (i.e. invariant under relabeling of the voters and/or alternatives). These results
have led to characterizations of the Borda rule (Young, 1974a, 1975; Nitzan and Rubinstein,
1981), Kemeny rule (Young and Levenglick, 1978), and plurality rule (Richelson, 1978;
Morkelyunas, 1982; Ching, 1996; Yeh, 2008) each as the only preference aggregation rule
which satisfies reinforcement along with certain other axioms.
Myerson (1995) generalized the Smith-Young results from preference aggregators to
abstract voting rules. In Myerson’s framework, there is a finite set of social alternatives
1Smith (1973) calls this condition ‘separability’, while Young (1974b, 1975) calls it ‘consistency’. Dhillon
(1998) and Dhillon and Mertens (1999) refer to an analogous property as ‘extended Pareto’.
2Smith (1973) and Young (1974b) consider rules which produce social preference relations as output,
whereas Young (1975) considers rules which produce subsets of social alternatives as output; these two
frameworks yield two slightly different definitions of ‘reinforcement’ and ‘scoring rule’.
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X and a finite set of ‘signals’ V . A ‘profile’ assigns a signal to each voter, and an abstract
voting rule selects some nonempty subset of X for each profile. A scoring rule is a voting
rule where each element of V assigns a real-valued ‘score’ to each element of X ; the rule
then selects the alternative(s) with the highest total score.3 Myerson showed that if an
abstract voting rule satisfied reinforcement, universal domain (i.e. it is defined for all
profiles), a form of neutrality (i.e. all social alternatives are treated equally), and an
Archimedean/continuity condition he called overwhelming majority, then it was a scoring
rule. For example, approval voting (Brams and Fishburn, 1983) is a scoring rule —indeed,
it is the only abstract voting rule which satisfies reinforcement along with certain other
axioms (Fishburn, 1978; Morkelyunas, 1981; Alo´s-Ferrer, 2006).
In section 2, I extend Myerson’s representation theorem, by considering infinite signal
sets, and removing the hypotheses of universal domain and overwhelming majority. I do
this by considering scoring rules where the scores can range over an abstract linearly or-
dered abelian group, instead of ranging over the real numbers.4 I also characterize balance
rules (another class introduced by Myerson (1995)), the formally utilitarian voting rule,
and the range voting rule. Next, section 3 shows that the ‘neutrality’ (i.e. permutation-
equivariance) properties of a voting rule can be reflected by corresponding neutrality prop-
erties of its balance representation or scoring representation. Section 4 considers the sense
in which a real-valued balance representation or scoring representation of a voting rule is
unique up to some set of ‘rescalings’. Section 5 studies the relationship between balance
and scoring rules in more detail. Section 6 concludes with some open problems. Appendix
A provides some background on linearly ordered abelian groups. Appendix B contains the
proofs of all results in the paper. Appendix C contains further uniqueness results.
2 Model and main results
Let X be a set of social alternatives, and let V be the set of possible signals which could be
sent by each voter. (The sets X and V could be finite or infinite.) Let N := {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .}
and Z := {±n; n ∈ N}. For any n ∈ ZV , let ‖n‖ :=
∑
v∈V |nv|. Define N
〈V〉 := {n ∈ NV ;
‖n‖ <∞}. If n ∈ N〈V〉, then n represents an anonymous profile of voters: for each v ∈ V,
we interpret nv as the number of voters sending the signal v, while ‖n‖ is the size of the
whole population. Note that we do not fix ‖n‖ in advance. A domain is any collection of
profiles D ⊆ N〈V〉 such that 0 ∈ D. (The set N〈V〉 itself is the universal domain.) A (variable
population, anonymous) voting rule is a correspondence F : D ⇉ X such that F (0) = X .
Thus, for all d ∈ D, the outcome F (d) ⊆ X is a nonempty set (typically a singleton).
A linearly ordered abelian group is a triple (R,+, >), where R is a set, “+” is an abelian
group operation, and “>” is a complete, antisymmetric, transitive binary relation such
that, for all r, s ∈ R, if r > 0, then r + s > s. (For example: the set R of real numbers
is a linearly ordered abelian group, with the standard ordering and addition operator. So
is any subgroup of R. For any n ∈ N, the space Rn is a linearly ordered abelian group
3Zwicker (2008) has shown that such scoring rules can also be interpreted as ‘mean proximity rules’:
each element of V and X is represented as a vector in RN , and the social choice is the element of X which
is closest to the vector average of the signals of the voters.
4Smith (1973) also considered linearly ordered abelian groups.
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under vector addition and the lexicographic order.) Such groups are useful for representing
infinite-horizon intertemporal preferences, non-probabilistic uncertainty, and preferences
where some decision variables have lexicographical priority over others (Pivato, 2011).
For any r = (rv)v∈V ∈ R
V , we define a group homomorphism r : Z〈V〉−→R by setting
r(z) :=
∑
v∈V zvrv for all z ∈ Z
〈V〉.5 An R-valued score system on (X ,V) is an X -indexed
collection S := {sx}x∈X ⊂ R
V . For any domain D ⊆ N〈V〉, the scoring rule determined by S
is the voting rule FS : D ⇉ X defined as follows:
FS(d) := argmax
x∈X
sx(d), for all d ∈ D.
Intuitively, sx(d) is the ‘score’ which alternative x receives from the profile d; each voter
who sends the signal v contributes sxv ‘points’ to this score. The alternative with the highest
score wins.
For example, plurality vote is a scoring rule with V = X , and R = Z, and sxv = 1 if
x = v, while sxv = 0 if x 6= v. Approval vote is a scoring rule, where V is the set of all
subsets of X , and R = Z, and sxv = 1 if x ∈ v, while s
x
v = 0 if x 6∈ v. The Borda rule is
a scoring rule where V is the set of all strict preference orders over X , and R = Z, and
sxv = r if x is ranked rth place from the bottom in the preference order v. If (Y , d) is a
metric space, and X ,V ⊆ Y , then the median rule is the scoring rule where R = R, and
sxv = −d(x, v) for all x ∈ X and v ∈ V. This rule picks the element(s) of X which minimize
the average distance to the signals sent by the voters. (If X = V ⊆ R with the standard
metric, then this is the usual notion of the median of a collection of real numbers.) For
example, the Kemeny rule is a median rule where X = V is the set of all strict preference
orders over some set A of alternatives, and d is the Kendall metric on X (so d(x, v) is the
number of pairwise comparisons on which the orderings x and v disagree).
There are also several scoring rules where R = R and V is some subset of RX , and
svx := vx for all v ∈ V and x ∈ X . Formally utilitarian voting is obtained by setting
V := RX .6 Range voting is obtained by setting V := [0, 1]X (Smith, 2000; Gaertner and Xu,
2011). Relative utilitarianism is obtained by setting V := {v ∈ [0, 1]X ; minx∈X vx = 0 and
maxx∈X vx = 1} (Dhillon, 1998; Dhillon and Mertens, 1999). Finally, cumulative voting is
obtained by setting V := {v ∈ [0, 1]X ;
∑
x∈X vx = 1}.
Now suppose we first apply one scoring rule Fa, and then use a second scoring rule Fb
only to break any ties which arise in Fa. This can be modelled as an R-valued scoring rule,
where R = R2 with the lexicographical order. For example, the procedure, “first apply
approval vote; then break any ties using the Borda rule” can be modelled by defining
V = Va×Vb, where Va := {all subsets of X} and Vb := {all preference orders over X}. For
any (va, vb) ∈ Va × Vb, we set s(va, vb) := (sa(va), sb(vb)) ∈ R2, where sa is the approval
score system and sb is the Borda score system (as described above).
5Thus, if R = R, then r(z) = r • z, where “•” is the inner product operation on RV .
6‘Formally’ utilitarian voting corresponds to the true utilitarian social welfare order only if the scores
assigned by each voter are given by her cardinal utility function. But these scores could also be some
monotone transform of her cardinal utility function (e.g. the Nash SWO is obtained by adding the
logarithms of voters’ utilities). Or these scores could be completely unrelated to cardinal utility data.
Hence the qualifier ‘formally’.
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Hahn’s Embedding Theorem says that any linearly ordered abelian group is isomorphic
to an ordered subgroup of a lexicographically ordered vector space RI , where I is (possibly
infinite) linearly ordered set.7 Thus, any scoring rule can be interpreted as a (possibly
infinite) chain of real-valued scoring rules, each acting as a tie-breaker for the prior ones.
Let (R,+, >) be a linearly ordered abelian group. Let D ⊆ N〈V〉 be a domain of profiles.
AnR-valued balance system on (X ,V ,D) is an X 2-indexed collection B := {bx,y}x,y∈X ⊂ R
V
such that bx,y = −by,x for all x, y ∈ X (in particular, bx,x = 0 for all x ∈ X ), and such
that,
max
x∈X
min
y∈X
bx,y(d) ≥ 0, for all d ∈ D. (1)
We then define the balance rule FB : D ⇉ X as follows: for all d ∈ D and x ∈ X , we let
x ∈ FB(d) if and only if b
x,y(d) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ X . (The condition (1) is equivalent to
stipulating that FB(d) 6= ∅ for all d ∈ D.)
Example 2.1. (a) Let S = {sx}x∈X be an R-valued score system on (X ,V). For all
x, y ∈ X , define ∇x,yS := sx − sy ∈ RV , to obtain a balance system ∇S := {∇x,yS}x,y∈X .
Then F∇S(n) = FS(n) for all n ∈ N〈V〉.
(b) Let V be the set of all nonstrict preference orders over X . For all x, y ∈ X and v ∈ V,
define bx,yv := 1 if v prefers x to y, while b
x,y
v := −1 if v prefers y to x, and b
x,y
v := 0 if v
is indifferent between x and y. Then FB is the Condorcet rule: for any n ∈ N〈V〉, we have
x ∈ F (n) if and only if x is a Condorcet winner in the profile n (i.e. for any other y ∈ X ,
at least as many voters strictly prefer x over y as the number who strictly prefer y over x).
Unfortunately, F (n) = ∅ for some n ∈ N〈V〉 (the ‘Condorcet paradox’). Let D ⊂ N〈V〉 be
the set of all profiles having a Condorcet winner. Then FB : D ⇉ X is a balance rule. ♦
Let D ⊆ N〈V〉. A voting rule F : D ⇉ X satisfies reinforcement if the following is true:
for any n,m ∈ D, if F (n) ∩ F (m) 6= ∅, then n+m ∈ D, and F (n+m) = F (n) ∩ F (m).8
Here, the profile (n + m) represents a union of two disjoint subgroups, represented by
profiles n and m. Reinforcement says: if x ∈ X and both n and m endorse x (i.e.
x ∈ F (n) and x ∈ F (m)), then we should have x ∈ F (n+m). Furthermore, in this case,
F (n + m) should consist of only those x ∈ X which receive this joint endorsement. We
now come to our first main result:
Theorem 2.2 Let X and V be arbitrary sets, let D ⊆ N〈V〉 be any domain, and let F :
D ⇉ X be a voting rule. Then F satisfies reinforcement if and only if F is a balance rule.
Not every balance rule is a scoring rule, even if we require D = N〈V〉 (see Example
5.2 below). Thus, we must add some other hypotheses to reinforcement to characterize
scoring rules. Let ΠV be the group of all permutations of V . For any n ∈ N〈V〉 and
π ∈ ΠV , we define π(n) := m, where mv := npi−1(v) for all v ∈ V. Let ΠX be the group
of all permutations of X . A voting rule F : D ⇉ X is neutral if there exists a group
homomorphism ν : ΠX−→ΠV (the neutralizer) such that, for all π ∈ ΠX , if π˜ := ν(π),
7See Hausner and Wendel (1952).
8Note that we do not require the domain D itself to be closed under addition. For example, the
Condorcet rule in Example 2.1(b) satisfies reinforcement, but its domain is not additively closed.
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then the domain D is π˜-invariant, and F (π˜(d)) = π (F (d)) for all d ∈ D. Thus, every
alternative in X is treated equally: for any x, y ∈ X , and every profile d ∈ D such that
x ∈ F (d), there exists some permutation d′ of d such that y ∈ F (d′).
For any π ∈ ΠV and any r ∈ R
V , we define rπ ∈ RV by (rπ)v = rpi(v) for all v ∈ V.
Let ν : ΠX−→ΠV be a homomorphism. A score system S = {s
x}x∈X is ν-neutral if, for all
π ∈ ΠX and x, y ∈ X , if π(y) = x and π˜ := ν(π), then s
x π˜ = sy. Except for abstract
median rules, all the scoring rules mentioned above (including the Kemeny rule) have
neutral score systems, with the obvious neutralizers. A domain D ⊆ N〈V〉 is a cone if
d1 + d2 ∈ D whenever d1,d2 ∈ D, and also, d ∈ D whenever nd ∈ D for some n ∈ N.
(For example, the universal domain N〈V〉 is a cone.) Here is our second main result:
Theorem 2.3 Let X be a finite set, let V be any set, let D ⊆ N〈V〉 be a cone, and let
F : D ⇉ X be any voting rule. Then F is neutral and satisfies reinforcement if and only
if F is a scoring rule with a neutral score system.
Thus, combining reinforcement with neutrality yields a scoring rule with a neutral score
system. By combining reinforcement with weaker (but more technical) hypothesis, we can
also obtain scoring rules with non-neutral score systems (see Proposition 5.3).
Theorem 2.3 considers a rule F defined on a domain D ⊆ N〈V〉. Given a score system
S, we have FS(n) 6= ∅ for all n ∈ N〈V〉; thus, the scoring representation offers a way to
‘extend’ F from D to all of N〈V〉. However, we might still wish to restrict FS to the smaller
domain D. For example, suppose we have adopted F on the basis of certain normative
criteria which only make sense inside D (e.g. Condorcet consistency). If n ∈ N〈V〉 \ D,
then we might regard the value of FS(n) as a meaningless artifact; the normative criteria
which justify F inside D do not apply at n.9
A voting rule F satisfies overwhelming majority10 if, for any n,n′ ∈ N〈V〉, there exists
some M ∈ N such that, for all m > M , we have F (mn + n′) ⊆ F (n). This means: if one
sub-population of voters (represented by mn) is much larger than another sub-population
(represented by n′), then the choice of the combined population should be determined
by the choice of the larger sub-population —except that the smaller sub-population may
act as a ‘tie-breaker’ in some cases. Myerson (1995) showed that, if the voting rule in
Theorem 2.3 satisfies overwhelming majority, then not only is it a scoring rule, but the
score system is real-valued. Our next result makes an analogous statement for the balance
rule in Theorem 2.2, without assuming neutrality. A voting rule F : N〈V〉 ⇉ X satisfies
the tie condition (TC) if, for all distinct x, y ∈ X :
(TC1) There exists some n ∈ N〈V〉 with F (n) = {x, y}.
(TC2) For any finiteW ⊆ V, there exists some m ∈ N〈V〉 such thatmw > 0 for all w ∈ W,
and F (m) ⊇ {x, y}.
9A similar remark applies to a balance rule FB : D ⇉ X . There may exist other profiles n ∈ N〈V〉 \ D
which satisfy the nontriviality condition (1), so that FB(n) 6= ∅. But the fact that FB is well-defined
outside D does not imply that society is normatively compelled to apply FB outside D.
10Sometimes this is called continuity or the Archimedean property.
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For example: any nontrivial neutral balance rule satisfies TC (see Lemma B.9).
Proposition 2.4 Let F : N〈V〉 ⇉ X be a balance rule satisfying TC. Then F satisfies
overwhelming majority if and only if F = FB for some real-valued balance system B.
Theorem 2.3 makes the class of scoring rules quite attractive. What is the ‘best’ scoring
rule? Our last two major results offers two possible answers to this question. Let V and
W be two sets, and let α :W−→V. Define α∗ : N〈W〉−→N〈V〉 as follows: for any n ∈ N〈W〉,
and any v ∈ V, α∗(n)v :=
∑
{nw; w ∈ W and α(w) = v}. Given two voting rules
F : N〈V〉 ⇉ X and G : N〈W〉 ⇉ X , we say that F is at least as expressive as G if there
is a some function α : W−→V such that, for all n ∈ N〈W〉, F (α∗(n)) = G(n). Thus, for
any w ∈ W, voting for w in the rule G is effectively equivalent to voting for α(w) in F .
Thus, the voters can express any profile of opinions via F which they could have expressed
via G. The rule F is the most expressive member of some class of rules if it is at least as
expressive as every other element of that class.11
Proposition 2.5 Let X be a finite set. Formally utilitarian voting is the most expressive
X -valued voting rule which satisfies reinforcement, neutrality, and overwhelming majority.
For any v ∈ V, define 1v ∈ N〈V〉 by (1v)v := 1, whereas (1v)w := 0 for all w ∈ V \{v}. A
voting rule F : N〈V〉 ⇉ X admits minority overrides if, for any n ∈ N〈V〉, there is some v ∈ V
such that F (n+1v) 6= F (n). Thus, regardless of the size of the populace and the weight of
existing public opinion, a single voter can always cast a vote which changes the outcome.
Such ‘overrides’ not only generate political instability; they are arguably undemocratic.
It might be better if F did not admit minority overrides.12 If V is finite, then any rule
satisfying overwhelming majority will not admit minority overrides.13 However, we will be
interested in the case when V is infinite. For neutral voting rules, an absence of minority
overrides is effectively equivalent to imposing upper and lower bounds on the scores which
voters can assign to alternatives (see Lemma B.11). For example: formally utilitarian
voting admits minority overrides, but all of the other aforementioned scoring rules do not.
Proposition 2.6 Let X be a finite set. Range voting is the most expressive X -valued
voting rule which satisfies reinforcement, neutrality, overwhelming majority, and does not
admit minority overrides.
Despite Propositions 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, overwhelming majority is not always normatively
compelling. In some cases, a non-real-valued scoring system may be more appropriate.
11If we are interested in maximizing expressiveness, then it does not make sense to impose domain
restrictions. That is why we have assumed the universal domain D = N〈V〉 in this paragraph and the next
two results.
12Of course, there will always be some profiles where a single voter can change the outcome; the point
is that this should not be true for all profiles.
13Proof. Find n ∈ N〈V〉 such that |F (n)| = 1. If M ∈ N is large enough, then overwhelming majority
protects the profile Mn from minority overrides.
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Example 2.7. Let X be a two-dimensional policy space. That is: X ⊂ X1 × X2, where
X1 is a space of alternatives in one ‘policy dimension’, while X2 is a space of alternatives
along some other dimension. Note that X is a proper subset of X1 × X2 —not all policy
combinations are feasible. Suppose X1 is considered to be lexicographically prior to X2
(e.g. X1 represents basic human rights, while X2 represents GDP). For j = 1, 2, let Vj
be a space of signals, and suppose we have decided to use the R-valued score system
jS = {js
x}x∈X ⊂ R
Vj on (Xj,Vj). If we simply apply the scoring rules F1S : N
〈V1〉 ⇉ X1
and F2S : N
〈V2〉 ⇉ X2 separately, then we may end up selecting an element of (X1×X2)\X
—an infeasible policy. We could combine 1S and 2S into a single, R-valued score system S
on (X ,V1 × V2) by defining s
x1,x2
v1,v2
:= 1s
x1
v1
+ 2s
x2
v2
for all (x1, x2) ∈ X and (v1, v2) ∈ V1 × V2.
But this would not respect the lexicographical priority of X1 over X2.
Instead, letR := R2 with the vector addition operation ‘+’ and the lexicographical ordering
‘≻’ (i.e. (r1, r2) ≻ (s1, s2) if and only if either r1 > s1, or r1 = s1 and r2 > s2). Then
(R,+,≻) is a linearly ordered abelian group. Define an R-valued score system S on
(X ,V1 × V2) by setting s
x1,x2
v1,v2
:= (1s
x1
v1
, 2s
x2
v2
) for all (x1, x2) ∈ X and (v1, v2) ∈ V1 × V2. ♦
3 Generalized neutrality
The two results of this section show how the neutrality properties of a voting rule F can be
‘encoded’ in a balance system or scoring system for F . They are also key technical steps
in the proof of Theorem 2.3.
Let Π′X ⊆ ΠX be any subgroup of permutations of X , and let ν : Π
′
X−→ΠV be a group
homomorphism. For any domain D ⊆ N〈V〉, a voting rule F : D ⇉ X is ν-neutral if, for all
π ∈ Π′X , if π˜ = ν(π), then D is π˜-invariant and F (π˜(d)) = π (F (d)) for all d ∈ D. (For
example: let X = V be a metric space, let Π′X be the set of all self-isometries of X , and
let ν : Π′X−→ΠX = ΠV be the inclusion map. Then the median rule on X is ν-neutral.)
A balance system B is ν-neutral if, for all x, y, x′, y′ ∈ X and π ∈ Π′X , if x
′ := π−1(x)
and y′ := π−1(y) and π˜ = ν(π), then bx,yπ˜ = bx
′,y′ . A score system S = {sx}x∈X is
ν-neutral if, for all π ∈ Π′X and x, y ∈ X , if π(y) = x and π˜ := ν(π), then s
x π˜ = sy. A
voting rule, balance system, or score system is Π′X -neutral if it is ν-neutral for some group
homomorphism ν : Π′X−→ΠV (called the neutralizer).
Proposition 3.1 Let X be a finite set, let V be an arbitrary set, let D ⊆ N〈V〉 be a domain,
and let F : D ⇉ X be a scoring rule. Let Π′X be any group of permutations of X , and let
ν : Π′X−→ΠV be a homomorphism. Then F is ν-neutral if and only if F = FS for some
ν-neutral score system S.
The corresponding result for balance rules is a bit more complicated. Let Π′X be a group
of permutations of X . We say that Π′X is doubly transitive if, for all x, y, x
′, y′ ∈ X with
x 6= y and x′ 6= y′, there exists some π ∈ Π′X such that π(x) = x
′ and π(y) = y′.
A balance system B is perfect on the domain D if, for any d ∈ D, any x ∈ FB(d) and
any y ∈ X \ FB(d), we have b
x,y(d) > 0. (For instance: Example 2.1(a) is perfect, but
Example 2.1(b) is not perfect.) Perfection simplifies the computation of F (d): once we
find one point x ∈ FB(d), we have FB(d) = {y ∈ X ; b
x,y(d) = 0}.
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Proposition 3.2 Let X be a finite set, let V be an arbitrary set, let D ⊆ N〈V〉 be a domain,
and let F : D ⇉ X be a balance rule. Let Π′X be a doubly transitive group of permutations
of X , and let ν : Π′X−→ΠV be a homomorphism. Then F is ν-neutral if and only if F = FB
for some ν-neutral perfect balance system B.
4 Uniqueness
Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 characterize when a voting rule admits a balance representation
or scoring representation. Now we consider the uniqueness of these representations. Let
S := {sx}x∈X and S˜ := {s˜
x}x∈X be two real-valued score systems on (X ,V). Say S˜ is an
affine transform of S if there exists r > 0 and t ∈ RV such that s˜x = r sx+t, for all x ∈ X .
Proposition 4.1 Let X and V be finite sets, and let Π′X be a transitive group of permu-
tations on X . Let S and S˜ be two real-valued score systems on (X ,V). Suppose the vectors
{sx}x∈X are linearly independent in RV , and FS is Π′X -neutral. Then:
(a) FS = FeS on N
V if and only if S˜ is an affine transform of S.
(b) If S and S˜ are Π′X -neutral, then t π˜ = t for all π ∈ Π
′
X . In particular, if the group
Π˜′X = {π˜; π ∈ Π
′
X} acts transitively on V, then t is a constant vector.
Example 4.2. Let V := {all preference orders over X}. For any π ∈ ΠX , define π˜ ∈ ΠV
such that π˜(v) prefers π(x) to π(y) if and only if v prefers x to y. Then Π˜X acts transitively
on V . Thus, if S and S˜ are neutral, real-valued score systems on (X ,V), and FS = FeS, then
there exists r > 0 and t ∈ R such that s˜xv = r s
x
v + t for all x ∈ X and v ∈ V. ♦
Suppose V is finite and B = {bx,y}x,y∈X is a real-valued balance system on V . Given
a domain D ⊆ NV , let R+[D] be the set of all R+-linear combinations of elements of D;
this is a convex cone in RV+. The domain D is thick if D is closed under addition (i.e.
d1+d2 ∈ D whenever d1,d2 ∈ D) and R+[D] has nonempty interior in RV . (For example,
the universal domain NV is thick.) For any x ∈ X , define
R
Cx := {r ∈ R+[D] ; bx,y(r) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ X}. (2)
This is a convex cone which is relatively closed in R+[D]. A subset H ⊂ RV is a hyperplane
if there is a nontrivial linear function φ : RV−→R such that H = ker(φ). A subset B ⊂ RV
is hyperplanar if there exists a unique hyperplane H such that B ⊆ H. For any x, y ∈ X ,
let Bx,y := RCx ∩ RCy; write “x
∼
B
y” if Bx,y is hyperplanar. The structure (X , ∼B ) is the
graph of the rule FB. (This graph can be nontrivial only if the domain D is thick.)
A voting rule F : D ⇉ X is nondegenerate if, for all x ∈ X , there exists d ∈ D
with F (d) = {x}. (For example: any nontrivial, neutral balance rule is nondegenerate;
see Lemma B.8.) A balance system B is nondegenerate on D if the rule FB : D ⇉ X is
nondegenerate. We say B has no zeros if bx,y 6= 0 for any x, y ∈ X with x ∼
B
y. (For
example, if S is a scoring system, and B = ∇S as in Example 2.1(a), then B has no zeros if
sx 6= sy for all distinct x, y ∈ X , which holds if FS is nondegenerate.) The next result says
that, subject to these mild conditions, a R-valued balance system B is uniquely determined
by the structure of FB, up to independent scalar multiplication of the balance vectors.
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Proposition 4.3 Let X and V be finite sets, and let D ⊆ NV be a thick domain. Let B and
B˜ be R-valued balance systems on X with no zeros, with FB nondegenerate. Then FB = FeB
on D if and only if, for every x ∼
B
y ∈ X , there is some rx,y > 0 such that b˜
x,y = rx,y ·b
x,y.
Let S be a real-valued score system on (X ,V). For any x, y ∈ X , write “x ∼
S
y” if x ∼
∇S
y,
where ∇S is as in Example 2.1(a). For any z ∈ X , if x ∼
S
y, y ∼
S
z, and x ∼
S
z, then write
“(x ∼
S
y) ≡ (y ∼
S
z)”. Thus, “≡” is a symmetric binary relation on the edges of the graph
(X , ∼
S
). Let “∼=” be the transitive closure of “≡”; then “∼=” is an equivalence relation on
the edges. Say S is simple if every edge is equivalent to every other edge via this relation.
(For example: if x ∼
S
y for all x, y ∈ X , then S is simple.)
Proposition 4.4 Let X and V be finite sets, and let D ⊆ NV be a thick domain. Let S
be a simple, nondegenerate real-valued score system on X , and let S˜ be another real-valued
score system. Then FS = FeS on D if and only if S˜ is an affine transform of S.
Example 4.5. If S is not simple, then the conclusion of Proposition 4.4 does not hold. For
example, suppose V = {1, 2, 3}, X = {x, y, z}, and
R
Cx, RCy, and RCz are as shown in Figure
1(a). Then x ∼
S
y and y ∼
S
z, but x 6∼
S
z. (Thus, (x ∼
S
y) 6≡ (y ∼
S
z).) Define s˜x := sx + sy,
s˜y := 2sy, and s˜z = 2sz. Then: s˜x − s˜y = sx − sy and s˜y − s˜z = 2(sy − sz), so Example
2.1(a) and Proposition 4.3 imply that FeS = FS. But S˜ is not an affine transformation of S.
For another example, suppose V = {1, 2, 3}, X = {w, x, y, z}, and
R
Cw, RCx, RCy, and RCz
are as shown in Figure 1(b). Then w ∼
S
x ∼
S
y ∼
S
z ∼
S
w, but w 6∼
S
y and x 6∼
S
z. Suppose
further that sw − sz = sx − sy (as indicated by the fact that the boundaries Bw,z and
Bx,y are coplanar in R3). Define s˜w := sw + sx, s˜x := 2sx, s˜y := 2sy, and s˜z = sz + sy.
Then clearly, s˜w − s˜x = sw − sx, s˜z − s˜y = sz − sy, and s˜x − s˜y = 2(sx − sy). Finally,
s˜w − s˜z = (sw + sx)− (sz + sy) = (sw − sz) + (sx− sy) = 2(sw − sz). Thus, Example 2.1(a)
and Proposition 4.3 imply that FeS = FS. But S˜ is not an affine transformation of S. ♦
Appendix C contains an analogue to Proposition 4.3 where B is not necessarily real-valued,
and X and V can be infinite. We do not yet have analogues for Propositions 4.1 and 4.4.
5 From balance rules to scoring rules
Not every balance rule is a scoring rule.
Lemma 5.1 Let D ⊆ N〈V〉 be a domain. A voting rule F : D ⇉ X is a scoring rule if and
only if F is a balance rule with a balance system B = {bx,y}x,y∈X satisfying:
bx,y(d) + by,z(d) = bx,z(d), for all x, y, z ∈ X and d ∈ D. (3)
Example 5.2. Let X := {x, y, z}, let V be finite, and let D := NV . Let L ⊂ RV be a proper
linear subspace, and consider an R-valued balance system B such that bx,z,by,z ∈ L, but
bx,y 6∈ L, and such that x ∼
B
y ∼
B
z ∼
B
x, as shown in Figure 1(c). If B˜ is any other R-valued
balance system such that FeB = FB, then Proposition 4.3 implies that b˜
x,z, b˜y,z ∈ L, but
b˜x,y 6∈ L. Thus, B˜ cannot satisfy condition (3); thus FB is not a scoring rule.14 ♦
14Myerson (1995, Example 2) gives another, more complicated example of a balance rule which is not a
scoring rule.
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Figure 1: Let V = {1, 2, 3}. These pictures are projections of NV onto the ‘rational unit simplex’
∆Q := {q ∈ Q3+; q1+ q2+ q3 = 1}. (Thus, each d-dimensional feature in these pictures actually represents
a (d + 1)-dimensional cone in R3+). If a rule F : N
V
⇉ X satisfies reinforcement, then it is homogeneous:
F (Mn) = F (n) for all M ∈ N. Thus, if we define f(n/‖n‖) := F (n), then we obtain a correspondence
f : ∆Q ⇉ X , which completely encodes the structure of F . (a,b) Nonsimple scoring rules with
non-unique scoring representations; see Example 4.5. (c) A balance rule which is not a scoring rule;
see Example 5.2.
Let B be a real-valued balance system on (X ,V). Recall the relation ‘ ∼
B
’ on X defined
in section 4. Let E := {(x, y) ∈ X 2; x ∼
B
y}; thus, E represents all (directed) edges in the
graph (X , ∼
B
). The set ZE is an abelian group under componentwise addition; an element
of ZE is called a chain on (X , ∼
B
). If R is a linearly ordered abelian group, and B is an
R-valued balance system on (X ,V), then we define a group homomorphism B : ZE−→RV
by setting B(c) :=
∑
(x,y)∈E cx,yb
x,y for any chain c = (cx,y)(x,y)∈E in ZE . For any c ∈ ZE ,
its boundary ∂c is the element of ZX defined by setting (∂c)x :=
∑
(x,y)∈E(cy,x−cx,y), for all
x ∈ X . The chain c is a cycle if ∂c = 0. If Z(X , ∼
B
) is the set of all cycles, then Z(X , ∼
B
)
is a subgroup of ZE .
For example, for any x ∈ X , define [x] ∈ ZX by [x]x := 1, whereas [x]y := 0 for
all y 6= x. Likewise, for any x ∼
B
y ∈ X , define [x, y] ∈ ZE by [x, y]x,y := 1, whereas
[x, y]w,z = 0 for all (w, z) 6= (x, y). Then ∂[x, y] = [y] − [x]. Next, consider a path
x0 ∼B x1
∼
B
x2 ∼B · · ·
∼
B
xN (for some x0, x1, x2, . . . , xN ∈ X ). This path can be represented
by the path chain c := [x0, x1] + [x1, x2] + · · · + [xN−1, xN ]. (Observe that −c represents
the reversed path xN ∼B · · ·x3
∼
B
x2 ∼B x1.) In this case (∂c)x = [xN ]− [x0] for (so ∂c picks
out the endpoints of the path). Thus, c is a cycle if and only if xN = x0 (i.e. the path is
closed). Any chain is a sum of path chains, and any cycle is a sum of closed path chains.
Proposition 5.3 Let X and V be finite sets, let B be a nondegenerate, real-valued balance
system on (X ,V), and consider the balance rule FB : N〈V〉 ⇉ X . If B(z) = 0 for all
z ∈ Z(X , ∼
B
), then FB is a scoring rule.
Example 5.4. A graph (X ,∼) is a tree if Z(X ,∼) is trivial. This means (X ,∼) contains
no nontrivial closed paths. (The graph in Figure 1(a) is a tree, but the graphs in Figures
1(b,c) and 2 are not.) In this case, Proposition 5.3 implies that FB is a scoring rule.
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For instance, suppose the elements of X can be arranged on a line.15 Then it makes sense
to design the voting rule so that x ∼ y if and only if x and y are adjacent in the line. Then
(X ,∼) is a tree, so any nondegenerate R-valued perfect balance rule is a scoring rule. ♦
6 Open problems
The conditions of reinforcement and neutrality are sufficient to obtain a scoring rule (The-
orem 2.3), but neutrality is not necessary (Proposition 5.3). Are there normatively com-
pelling conditions which are both necessary and sufficient for a scoring rule? Are there
normatively compelling balance rules which are not scoring rules? Most of our results as-
sume X is finite —can this hypothesis be eliminated? Many of our results (e.g. Theorems
2.2 and 2.3) allow score systems or balance systems ranging over an abstract linearly or-
dered abelian group. But in all the natural examples, the score system is real-valued. This
is due to the overwhelming majority property, but in some cases, this property may be
inappropriate (Example 2.7). Is there a normatively compelling scoring or balance system
which is not real-valued?
Appendix A: Homogeneous orders on abelian groups
Let (R,+) be an abelian group, and let () be a binary relation on R. We say that ()
is homogeneous if, for all r, s ∈ R, we have (r  s) ⇐⇒ (r− s  0). The positive conoid16
of () is the set P := {r ∈ R; r  0}. The conoid P completely encodes the relation
(): for any r, s ∈ R, we have(
r  s
)
⇐⇒
(
r − s ∈ P
)
. (A1)
Conversely, given any subset P ⊆ R, we can use formula (A1) to define a unique homo-
geneous binary relation () such that P = P . Thus, there is a bijective correspondence
between homogeneous binary relations on R and subsets of R.
Let P ⊆ R. Recall that P is additively closed if p1 + p2 ∈ P whenever p1, p2 ∈ P. We
say that P is divisible if, for all r ∈ R and n ∈ N, if n r ∈ P, then r ∈ P also. Thus, P is a
cone if it is both additively closed and divisible. A preorder conoid is an additively closed
subset of R which contains 0. A partial order conoid is an additively closed subset of R
which does not contain 0. (Equivalently: for all r ∈ R, at most one of r or −r is in P).
A preorder or partial order conoid P is complete if, for all r ∈ R \ {0}, at least one of r
or −r is in P . (Any complete preorder or partial order conoid is divisible.) A linear order
cone is a complete partial order conoid. (Thus, for all r ∈ R\ {0}, exactly one of r ∈ P or
−r ∈ P.) Properties of () correspond to properties of the conoid P as follows:
15For example X could be a linearly ordered set of ‘grades’ which we could assign to some object. Or, X
could be the set of possible locations for a facility in a one-dimensional geography, such as along a highway
or river. Or X could be a set of political parties, arranged from ‘right’ to ‘left’. Or X could represent a
one-dimensional policy variable, such as the central bank interest rate.
16This object is are often called the positive cone. However, we are reserving the term cone for a set
which is divisible. Hence the ungainly term ‘conoid’.
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Lemma A.1 Let (R,+) be an abelian group. Let () be a homogeneous binary relation
on R.
(a) () is transitive iff P is additively closed. Likewise, () is a preorder iff P is a
preorder conoid. Also, () is a partial order iff P is a partial order conoid. Finally,
() is a linear order iff P is a linear order cone.
(b) Suppose () is a homogeneous preorder; let (≻) be its asymmetric part, and let
(≈) be its symmetric part. The set O := {r ∈ R; r ≈ 0} is a subgroup. Let
R′ := R/O be the quotient group, let φ : R−→R′ be the quotient map, and define
P ′ := φ(P) \ {0′}. Then P ′ is a partial order conoid on R′.
Let (≻′) be the homogeneous partial order on R′ defined by the conoid P ′. Then for
all r, s ∈ R, we have φ(r) ≻′ φ(s) if and only if r ≻ s.
The proof is straightforward. Next, we extend a classic result about partial orders to
the setting of homogeneous orders. If () and (′) are two relations on R, we say that
(′) extends () if, for all r, s ∈ R, we have (r  s) =⇒ (r ′ s). An abelian group (R,+)
is torsion free if n r 6= 0 for any n ∈ Z \ {0} and r ∈ R \ {0}.
Homogeneous Szpilrajn Lemma. Let (R,+) be a torsion free abelian group. Any
homogeneous partial order on R can be extended to a homogeneous linear order.
Proof: Let (≻) be a homogeneous partial order on R, and let P := P≻. Then P ⊆ R is a
partial order conoid. We must construct a linear order cone L ⊆ R such that P ⊆ L.
Define D0 := {r ∈ R; n r ∈ P for some n ∈ N}.
Claim 1: D0 is a divisible partial order conoid.
Proof: Let d1, d2 ∈ D0. Then n1 d1 = p1 ∈ P and n2 d2 = p2 ∈ P for some n1, n2 ∈ N.
Thus, (n1n2) (d1 + d2) = n2n1 d1 + n1n2 d2 = n2 p1 + n1 p2 ∈ P also, because P is
closed under addition. Thus, (d1 + d2) ∈ D0. Thus, D0 is additively closed. Clearly,
0 6∈ D0, because 0 6∈ P. Thus, D0 is a partial order conoid. Finally, D0 is divisible by
construction. 3 Claim 1
Let D := {D ⊆ R; D is a divisible partial order conoid and P ⊆ D}. Then D is
nonempty, because Claim 1 says D0 ∈ D.
Claim 2: Every ascending chain in D has an upper bound.
Proof: Let C ⊆ D be a chain. (That is: for all C1, C2 ∈ C, either C1 ⊆ C2, or C2 ⊆ C1.) Let
C :=
⋃
C∈CC. It suffices to show that C ∈ D also. Clearly, P ⊆ C. Also, 0 6∈ C because
0 6∈ C for all C ∈ C. It remains to show that C is additively closed and divisible.
Additively Closed. let c1, c2 ∈ C. Then there exist some C1, C2 ∈ C such that c1 ∈ C1
and c2 ∈ C2. Without loss of generality, suppose C1 ⊆ C2. Then c1 ∈ C2 also. Thus,
c1 + c2 ∈ C2, because C2 is additively closed. Thus, c1 + c2 ∈ C also.
Divisible. Let r ∈ R and n ∈ N, and suppose n r ∈ C Then there exist some C ∈ C
such that n r ∈ C. Then r ∈ C (because C is divisible because C ∈ C ⊆ D); thus, r ∈ C
also. 3 Claim 2
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Zorn’s Lemma and Claim 2 imply that D has a maximal element —call it L. Clearly,
P ⊆ L. It remains only for us to show that L is a linear order cone.
Now, L ∈ D, so it is a partial order conoid. Let s ∈ R \ {0}. We must show that
either s ∈ L or −s ∈ L. By contradiction, suppose neither were true. Then let Qs :=
L ∪ {ℓ + n s; ℓ ∈ L and n ∈ N} ∪ {n s; n ∈ N and n 6= 0}. Clearly, L ⊂ Qs. Thus,
P ⊂ Qs (because P ⊆ L because L ∈ D). Also, L 6= Qs, because s ∈ Qs whereas s 6∈ L
by hypothesis.
Claim 3: Qs is a partial order conoid.
Proof: Clearly, Qs is additively closed. We must show that 0 6∈ Qs. Now, 0 6∈ L because
L is a partial order conoid. Also, n s 6= 0 for any nonzero n ∈ N, because s 6= 0 and
(R,+) is torsion free. It remains to show that ℓ + n s 6= 0, for any ℓ ∈ L and n ∈ N.
By contradiction, suppose ℓ + n s = 0. Thus, n (−s) = ℓ. But then −s ∈ L, because
L is divisible, because L ∈ D by construction. But this contradicts our hypothesis on
s. 3 Claim 3
Now, let D′s := {r ∈ R; n r ∈ Qs for some n ∈ N}. Then an argument identical
to Claim 1 shows that D′s is a divisible partial order conoid containing Qs, and hence,
containing P . Thus, D′s ∈ D. But clearly, L ( Qs ⊆ D
′
s. But this contradicts the
presumed maximality of L in D.
By contradiction, either s ∈ L or −s ∈ L. This argument works for all s ∈ L. Thus, L
is a linear order cone. Since P ⊆ L, the homogeneous linear order defined by L extends
the homogeneous partial order (≻). 2
Corollary A.2 Let (A,+) be an abelian group.
(a) If (A,+) is torsion free, then A has a homogeneous linear ordering.
(b) Let B ⊂ A be a divisible proper subgroup. Then there exists a complete, homoge-
neous preorder () on A such that B = {a ∈ A; a ≈ 0}.
Proof: (a) Let a ∈ A be arbitrary. Let P := {n a; n ∈ N}. Then P is additively closed
and 0 6∈ P (because A is torsion free), so P is a partial order conoid on A. If (≻) is
the homogeneous partial order defined by P , then the Homogeneous Szpilrajn Lemma
extends (≻) to a homogeneous linear order on A.
(b) Let Q := A/B, and let q : A−→Q be the quotient map. Then Q is a torsion
free group, because B is divisible. Thus, part (a) yields a linear order (>) on Q. Now,
define () on A by stipulating that a1  a2 if and only if q(a1) ≥ q(a2). It is easy
to check that () is a complete, homogeneous preorder, and clearly, B = {a ∈ A;
q(a) = 0} = {a ∈ A; a ≈ 0}. 2
Let (R,+, >) be a linearly ordered abelian group, and let r, s ∈ R be positive. We say
r is infinitesimal relative to s if N r < s for all N ∈ N. We say (R,+, >) is Archimedean
if it has no infinitesimal elements. For example (R,+, >) (with the standard ordering) is
Archimedean. We state the next result for future reference.
13
Ho¨lder’s theorem. (R,+, >) is Archimedean if and only if it is isomorphic to a sub-
group of (R,+, >).
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.2. “⇐=” is straightforward.
“=⇒” is an immediate consequence of Lemma B.1, which we prove next. 2
Lemma B.1 Let D ⊂ N〈V〉 be a domain. If F : D ⇉ X satisfies reinforcement, then
F = FB for some perfect balance system B.
Proof: Let Z〈V〉 := {n ∈ ZV ; ‖n‖ < ∞}. For all x ∈ X , let Cx := {d ∈ D; x ∈ F (d)}.
Then Cx is a preorder conoid in the abelian group Z〈V〉. (We have 0 ∈ Cx because 0 ∈ D
and F (0) = X by definition. Meanwhile, Cx is closed under addition because F satisfies
reinforcement).
For any x, y ∈ X , let Px,y := {cx − cy; cx ∈ Cx and cy ∈ Cy}. Then Px,y is a preorder
conoid. (Px,y is closed under addition because Cx and Cy are closed under addition.)
Note that Py,x = −Px,y.
Let () be the homogeneous preorder on Z〈V〉 defined by Px,y. Let Ox,y := {z ∈ Z〈V〉;
z ≈ 0}, and let Rx,y := Z〈V〉/Ox,y, with the homogeneous partial order (≻) described in
Lemma A.1(b). Use the Homogeneous Szpilrajn Lemma to extend (≻) to a homogeneous
linear order ( >
x,y
) onRx,y. Let b
x,y : Z〈V〉−→Rx,y be the quotient map (i.e. bx,y(z) := z+
Ox,y for all z ∈ Z〈V〉). Note that Oy,x = Ox,y, so Ry,x = Rx,y as groups, and by,x = bx,y.
However, ( >
x,y
) is the negative ordering to ( >
y,x
) (i.e. (r >
x,y
r′) ⇐⇒ (−r >
y,x
− r′)).
Thus, without loss of generality, we can redefine ( >
y,x
) to be identical with ( >
x,y
), and
redefine by,x to be −bx,y (or vice versa; it doesn’t matter whether we reverse bx,y or
by,x, as long as we reverse only one of them). Finally, define bx,x := 0 for all x ∈ X .
Claim 1: Let d ∈ D and let x ∈ F (d). Then:
(a) bx,y(d) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ X (hence, x ∈ FB(d)).
(b) Furthermore, if y 6∈ F (d), then bx,y(d) > 0 (hence, y 6∈ FB(d)).
Proof: (a) If x ∈ F (d), then d ∈ Cx. Meanwhile 0 ∈ Cy; thus, d = d − 0 ∈ Px,y, so
d  0, so bx,y(d) ≥ 0.
(b) (by contradiction) Suppose bx,y(d) = 0. Then d ∈ Ox,y. Thus, d  0, so
−d  0, so −d ∈ Px,y. Thus, −d = cx − cy for some cx ∈ Cx and cy ∈ Cy. But
then cy = cx + d. Now, x ∈ F (d) and x ∈ F (cx), so F (d) ∩ F (cx) 6= ∅; thus
F (cy) = F (d + cx) = F (d) ∩ F (cx), by reinforcement. But y 6∈ F (d) by hypothesis,
so y 6∈ F (d) ∩ F (cx), so y 6∈ F (cy). But this contradicts the fact that cy ∈ Cy. By
contradiction, we cannot have bx,y(d) = 0. Thus, bx,y(d) > 0. 3 Claim 1
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For all d ∈ D, Claim 1(a) implies that F (d) ⊆ FB(d), while Claim 1(b) implies that
F (d) ⊇ FB(d). We conclude that F = FB. Furthermore, Claim 1(b) implies that the
balance system B is perfect.
Now we must construct a single linearly ordered abelian group R and a collection of
functions b˜x,y : V−→R (for all x, y ∈ X ) such that FB = FeB. Let R :=
∏
x,y∈X Rx,y with
the ‘Pareto’ order it gets from the linear orders on the components. Then extend this
to a homogeneous linear order on R using the Homogeneous Szpilrajn Lemma. 2
The proof of Theorem 2.3 depends upon Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, so it is deferred.
Lemma B.2 Let b ∈ RV .
(a) For any n ∈ N〈V〉 and π ∈ ΠV , we have (bπ)(n) = b (π(n)).
(b) For any π, φ ∈ ΠV , we have (bπ)φ = b (πφ).
Proof: (a) (bπ)(n) =
∑
v∈V
nv(bπ)v =
∑
v∈V
nvbpi(v) (∗)
∑
v′∈V
npi−1(v′)bv′ =
∑
v∈V
π(n)v′bv′ =
b(π(n)). Here, (∗) is the change of variables v′ := π(v).
(b) For any v ∈ V, if w := φ(v), then ((bπ)φ)v = (bπ)φ(v) = (bπ)w = bpi(w) = bpiφ(v) =
(b (πφ))v, as desired. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.1. “⇐=” is obvious.
“=⇒” Let S = {sx}x∈X be a score system such that F = FS. Define the score system
S = {sx}x∈X by setting
sx :=
∑
pi∈Π′
X
spi(x) π˜, for all x ∈ X .
Claim 1: F
S
= F .
Proof: “⊇” Let d ∈ D and x ∈ X . Suppose x ∈ F (d); we will show that x ∈ F
S
(d). For
any π ∈ Π′X , neutrality implies that π(x) ∈ F (π˜(d)). Thus, s
pi(x)(π˜(d)) ≥ sy(π˜(d))
for all y ∈ X and π ∈ Π′X . Equivalently, s
pi(x)(π˜(d)) ≥ spi(z)(π˜(d)) for all z ∈ X
and π ∈ Π′X . Thus, Lemma B.2(a) says (s
pi(x)π˜)(d) ≥ (spi(z)π˜)(d) for all z ∈ X and
π ∈ Π′X . Thus,
sx(d) =
∑
pi∈Π′
X
(spi(x) π˜)(d) ≥
∑
pi∈Π′
X
(spi(z) π˜)(d) = sz(d),
for all z ∈ X . Thus, x ∈ F
S
(d), as desired.
“⊆” (by contrapositive) Now suppose x 6∈ F (d); we will show that x 6∈ F
S
(d) .
Let y ∈ F (d). Then for any π ∈ Π′X , neutrality implies that π(x) 6∈ F (π˜(d)) and
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π(y) ∈ F (π˜(d)). Thus, spi(x)(π˜(d)) < spi(y)(π˜(d)) for all π ∈ Π′X . Thus, Lemma B.2(a)
says (spi(x)π˜)(d) < (spi(y)π˜)(d) for all π ∈ Π′X . Thus,
sx(d) =
∑
pi∈Π′
X
(
spi(x) π˜
)
(d) <
∑
pi∈Π′
X
(
spi(y) π˜
)
(d) = sy(d),
Thus, x 6∈ F
S
(d), as desired. 3 Claim 1
It remains to check that the system S := {sx}x∈X is ν-neutral. To see this, let x, y ∈ X ,
let φ ∈ Π′X , and suppose φ(y) = x. Then
sx φ˜ =
∑
pi∈Π′
X
spi(x) π˜
 φ˜
(∗)
∑
pi∈Π′
X
spi(x) (π˜φ˜)
(⋄)
∑
pi∈Π′
X
spi(x) π˜φ
(†)
∑
pi′∈Π′
X
spi
′φ−1(x) π˜′ =
∑
pi′∈Π′
X
spi
′(y) π˜′ = sy,
as desired. Here, (∗) is by linearity and Lemma B.2(b), (⋄) is because ν is a group
homomorphism, and (†) is the change of variables π′ := πφ. 2
Proposition 3.2 is a consequence of the following more technical result.
Proposition B.3 Let X , V, ν : Π′X−→ΠV , and D ⊆ N
〈V〉 be as in Proposition 3.2. Let
R be a linearly ordered abelian group, and let B˜ be a R-valued perfect balance system on
(X ,V). The balance rule FeB : D ⇉ X is ν-neutral if and only if FeB = FB for some
R-valued, ν-neutral, perfect balance system B on (X ,V).
Proof: “⇐=” Let B be a ν-neutral balance system. Let d ∈ D and let π ∈ Π′X . We must
show that FB(π˜(d)) = π(FB(d)).
“⊇” Let x ∈ FB(d), and let y = π(x). For all z ∈ X , if w = π
−1(z), then
by,z (π˜(d))
(∗)
(by,zπ˜) (d)
(†)
bx,w(d) ≥
(⋄)
0. (B1)
Here, (∗) is by Lemma B.2(a), (†) is because B is ν-neutral, and (⋄) is because x ∈ FB(d).
Since this holds for all z ∈ X , we conclude that y ∈ FB (π˜(d)).
“⊆” (by contrapositive) Now suppose x 6∈ FB(d). Then there is some w ∈ X such that
bx,w(d) < 0. Thus, if y = π(x) and z = π(w), then the inequality “≥
(⋄)
” in equation (B1)
changes to “<”; thus, y 6∈ FB (π˜(d)).
Thus FB (π˜(d)) = π (FB(d)). This holds for all d ∈ D and π ∈ Π
′
X . Thus, FB is
ν-neutral.
“=⇒” Fix x, y ∈ X with x 6= y. Double transitivity yields some α ∈ Π′X such that
α(x) = y and α(y) = x. Let N be the order of α (so αN = Id). Then N is finite, because
X is finite. Also, N is even, because α(x) = y and α2(x) = x. Let M = N/2. Define
b
x,y
:=
M−1∑
m=0
(
b˜x,yα˜2m − b˜x,yα˜2m+1
)
. (B2)
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Claim 1: b
x,y
α˜ = −b
x,y
.
Proof: We have
b
x,y
α˜
(B2)
(
M−1∑
m=0
b˜x,yα˜2m −
M−1∑
m=0
b˜x,yα˜2m+1
)
α˜ =
M−1∑
m=0
b˜x,yα˜2m+1 −
M−1∑
m=0
b˜x,yα˜2m+2
(∗)
M−1∑
m=0
b˜x,yα˜2m+1 −
M−1∑
m′=1
b˜x,yα˜2m
′
− b˜x,yα˜2M
(†)
M−1∑
m=0
b˜x,yα˜2m+1 −
M−1∑
m′=1
b˜x,yα˜2m
′
− b˜x,y
=
M−1∑
m=0
b˜x,yα˜2m+1 −
M−1∑
m′=0
b˜x,yα˜2m
′
(B2)
− b
x,y
, as desired.
(∗) is the change of variables m′ := m+ 1, while (†) is because α˜2M = Id. 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: Let d ∈ D.
(a) If x ∈ FeB(d), then b
x,y
(d) ≥ 0.
(b) If x 6∈ FeB(d), but y ∈ FeB(d), then b
x,y
(d) < 0.
Proof: (a) If x ∈ FeB(d), then for all m ∈ [0 . . .M), the neutrality of FeB implies that
x ∈ FeB(α˜
2m(d)), while y ∈ FeB(α˜
2m+1(d)) (because α2m(x) = x, while α2m+1(x) =
y). Thus, b˜x,y (α˜2m(d)) ≥ 0, while b˜x,y (α˜2m+1(d)) ≤ 0. Thus, Lemma B.2(a) says
(b˜x,yα˜2m)(d) ≥ 0, while (b˜x,yα˜2m+1)(d) ≤ 0. Thus,
b
x,y
(d)
(B2)
M−1∑
m=0
((
b˜x,yα˜2m
)
(d)−
(
b˜x,yα˜2m+1
)
(d)
)
≥ 0.
(b) If x 6∈ FeB(d) and y ∈ FeB(d), then for all m ∈ [0 . . .M), neutrality implies that
x 6∈ FeB(α˜
2m(d)) and y ∈ FeB(α˜
2m(d)), while y 6∈ FeB(α˜
2m+1(d)) and x ∈ FeB(α˜
2m+1(d))
(because α2m(x) = x and α2m(y) = y, while α2m+1(x) = y and α2m+1(y) = x). Thus,
b˜x,y (α˜2m(d)) < 0, while b˜x,y (α˜2m+1(d)) > 0, because B˜ is perfect. Thus, Lemma
B.2(a) says (b˜x,yα˜2m)(d) < 0, while (b˜x,yα˜2m+1)(d) > 0. Thus,
b
x,y
(d)
(B2)
M−1∑
m=0
((
b˜x,yα˜2m
)
(d)−
(
b˜x,yα˜2m+1
)
(d)
)
< 0,
because every summand is negative. 3 Claim 2
Let Πx,y := {π ∈ Π
′
X ; π(x) = x and π(y) = y} (a subgroup of Π
′
X ). Then Πx,y is finite,
because Π′X is finite, because X is finite. Define
bx,y :=
∑
pi∈Πx,y
(
b
x,y
π˜
)
. (B3)
Claim 3: bx,yα˜ = −bx,y.
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Proof:
bx,yα˜
(B3)
 ∑
pi∈Πx,y
b
x,y
π˜
 α˜ = ∑
pi∈Πx,y
(
b
x,y
π˜
)
α˜
(⋄)
∑
pi∈Πx,y
b
x,y
π˜α
=
∑
pi∈Πx,y
b
x,y ˜(αα−1πα)
(⋄)
∑
pi∈Πx,y
(
b
x,y
α˜
)
α˜−1πα
(∗)
∑
pi′∈Πx,y
(
b
x,y
α˜
)
π˜′
(†)
∑
pi′∈Πx,y
−b
x,y
π˜′ = −
∑
pi′∈Πx,y
b
x,y
π˜′
(B3)
− bx,y.
Here, both (⋄) are by Lemma B.2(b) (and the fact that ν is a homomorphism). Mean-
while, (∗) is by the change of variables π′ := απα−1 for all π ∈ Πx,y (observe that the
map (π 7→ απα−1) is a permutation of Πx,y, because α(x) = y and α(y) = x). Finally,
(†) is by Claim 1. 3 Claim 3
Claim 4: For any φ ∈ Πx,y, we have b
x,y φ˜ = bx,y.
Proof: bx,y φ˜
(B3)
 ∑
pi∈Πx,y
b
x,y
π˜
 φ˜
(⋄)
∑
pi∈Πx,y
b
x,y
π˜φ
(∗)
∑
pi′∈Πx,y
b
x,y
π˜′
(B3)
bx,y.
Here, (⋄) is by linearity and Lemma B.2(b), while (∗) is the change of variables π′ := πφ
(the map (π 7→ πφ) is a permutation of Πx,y, because φ ∈ Πx,y). 3 Claim 4
Now, for all w, z ∈ X , define Πw,z := {π ∈ Π
′
X ; π(w) = x and π(z) = y}; then Πw,z 6= ∅
by the double-transitivity of Π′X . Define b
w,z := bx,y π˜w,z, for any πw,z ∈ Πw,z
Claim 5: bw,z is well-defined independent of the choice of πw,z ∈ Πw,z.
Proof: Suppose πw,z ∈ Πw,z and φw,z ∈ Πw,z. Then πw,z φ
−1
w,z ∈ Πx,y. Thus,(
b
x,y
π˜w,z
)
φ˜−1w,z (∗) b
x,y
( ˜πw,z φ−1w,z) (†) b
x,y
, (B4)
where (∗) is by Lemma B.2(b), and (†) is by Claim 4. Multiplying both ends of (B4)
by φ˜w,z, we obtain: b
x,y
π˜w,z = b
x,y
φ˜w,z, as desired. 3 Claim 5
Claim 6: For any w, z, w′, z′ ∈ X and φ ∈ Π′X , if φ
−1(w) = w′ and φ−1(z) = z′, then
bw,zφ˜ = bw
′,z′ .
Proof: Let πw,z ∈ Πw,z. Then b
w,z = bx,yπ˜w,z by definition (and Claim 5). But πw,zφ ∈
Πw′,z′ (because πw,zφ(w
′) = πw,z(w) = x and πw,zφ(z
′) = πw,z(z) = y). Thus,
bw,zφ˜ = (bx,y π˜w,z) φ˜ (∗) b
x,y (π˜w,zφ) (†) b
w′,z′ ,
as desired. Here, (∗) is by Lemma B.2(b) and (†) is by definition (and Claim 5).
3 Claim 6
Claim 7: bz,w = −bw,z for all w, z ∈ X .
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Proof: Let πw,z ∈ Πw,z. Then απw,z ∈ Πz,w (because απw,z(z) = α(y) = x, etc.). Thus,
bz,w
(∗)
bx,y (α˜πw,z) (‡) (b
x,yα˜)π˜w,z (⋄) − b
x,yπ˜w,z (†) − b
w,z.
Here, (∗) is by definition of bz,w (and Claim 5). Next, (‡) is by Lemma B.2(b), (⋄) is
by Claim 3, and (†) is by definition of bw,z (and Claim 5). 3 Claim 7
Now define B := {bx,y}x,y∈X . Then B is a balance system by Claim 7, and B is ν-neutral
by Claim 6. The “⇐=” direction of the theorem (already established) then implies that
the balance rule FB is ν-neutral.
Claim 8: FB(d) = FeB(d) for all d ∈ D. Also, B is a perfect balance rule on D.
Proof: “⊇” Let d ∈ D and let w ∈ FeB(d). Fix z ∈ X and let πw,z ∈ Πw,z. Then π(w) = x
and π(z) = y. Since FeB is ν-neutral, we have FeB (π˜w,z(d)) = πw,z(FeB(d)); thus x ∈
FeB (π˜w,z(d)). Now, for any φ ∈ Πx,y, neutrality implies that x ∈ FeB
(
φ˜ π˜w,z(d)
)
; thus,
Claim 2(a) says that b
x,y
(
φ˜ π˜w,z(d)
)
≥ 0. But Lemma B.2(a) says b
x,y
(
φ˜ π˜w,z(d)
)
=(
b
x,y
φ˜
)
(π˜w,z(d)). Thus, we have(
b
x,y
φ˜
)
(π˜w,z(d)) ≥ 0, for all φ ∈ Πx,y. (B5)
Thus, bw,z(d)
(∗)
(bx,yπ˜w,z)(d) (†) b
x,y (π˜w,z(d))
(B3)
∑
φ∈Πx,y
(
b
x,y
φ˜
)
(π˜w,z(d)) ≥
(B5)
0. (B6)
Here, (∗) is by definition of bw,z (and Claim 5), while (†) is by Lemma B.2(a).
Inequality (B6) holds for any z ∈ X . Thus, w ∈ FB(d).
“⊆” (by contrapositive) Suppose w 6∈ FeB(d). Let z ∈ FeB(d). We will show that
bw,z(d) < 0, thereby showing both that w 6∈ FB(d) and that B is perfect.
If πw,z ∈ Πw,z, then the neutrality of FeB implies that x 6∈ FeB (π˜w,z(d)), while y ∈
FeB (π˜w,z(d)). Thus, for all φ ∈ Πx,y, we have x 6∈ FeB
(
φ˜ π˜w,z(d)
)
, while y ∈ FeB
(
φ˜ π˜w,z(d)
)
.
Thus, Claim 2(b) says that b
x,y
(
φ˜ π˜w,z(d)
)
< 0; hence Lemma B.2(a) says
(
b
x,y
φ˜
)
(π˜w,z(d)) <
0. This holds for all φ ∈ Πx,y; thus, an argument similar to equation (B6) yields
bw,z(d) < 0. Thus, w 6∈ FB(d). 3 Claim 8
2
Proof of Proposition 3.2. “⇐=” follows immediately from Proposition B.3 “⇐=”.
“=⇒” If F is a balance rule, then F satisfies reinforcement (by Theorem 2.2). Then
F = FeB for some perfect balance system B˜ (by Lemma B.1). Now apply Proposition B.3
“=⇒”. 2
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The proof of Theorem 2.3 requires Lemma 5.1, so we prove that first.
Proof of Lemma 5.1 “=⇒” follows from Example 2.1(a).
“⇐=” Let B = {bx,y}x,y∈X be a balance system on V satisfying (3), and such that
FB(d) = F (d) for all d ∈ D. Fix o ∈ X , and define s
o := 0
¯
. Then for all x ∈ X , define
sx := bx,o. This yields a score system S = {sx}x∈X on V . Let B˜ = ∇S (i.e. b˜
x,y := sx−sy
for all x, y ∈ X ). Thus, Example 2.1(a) implies that FS(n) = FeB(n) for all n ∈ N
〈V〉.
For any d ∈ D, and all x, y ∈ X , we have
b˜x,y(d) = sx(d)− sy(d) = bx,o(d)− by,o(d)
(∗)
bx,y(d),
where (∗) is by condition (3). Thus, FeB(d) = FB(d) for all d ∈ D. But FB(d) = F (d)
for all d ∈ D, by hypothesis. We conclude that FS(d) = F (d) for all d ∈ D. 2
The proof of Theorem 2.3 requires some preliminary lemmas. Let (A,+) be an abelian
group, and let S ⊆ A. Let 〈S〉 be the divisible subgroup generated by S —that is, 〈S〉 is
the smallest divisible subgroup of A which contains S.
Lemma B.4 Let (A,+) be an abelian group, let (R,+) be a torsion-free abelian group,
and let φ : A−→R be a group homomorphism. Let S ⊂ A. If φ(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S, then
φ(a) = 0 for all a ∈ 〈S〉.
Proof: Let K := {a ∈ A; φ(a) = 0}. Then S ⊆ K. We must show that 〈S〉 ⊆ K. To
do this, it suffices to show that K is a divisible subgroup. Clearly, K is a subgroup.
To see that K is divisible, let a ∈ A and n ∈ N and suppose n a ∈ K. Then we have
0 = φ(n a) = nφ(a). But R is torsion free, so this means φ(a) = 0; thus a ∈ K. 2
Lemma B.5 Let (A,+) be an abelian group. Let S1,S2 ⊆ A be arbitrary subsets, and
suppose that S := S1 ∪ S2 is additively closed. Then either 〈S〉 = 〈S1〉, or 〈S〉 = 〈S2〉.
Proof: Suppose 〈S1〉 6= 〈S〉; we will show that 〈S2〉 = 〈S〉. Clearly, 〈S1〉 ⊆ 〈S〉. Thus, if
〈S〉 6= 〈S1〉, then 〈S〉 6⊆ 〈S1〉, which means that S 6⊆ 〈S1〉. Thus, S \ 〈S1〉 6= ∅. Fix some
element s2 ∈ S \ 〈S1〉. Thus, s2 ∈ S \ S1 ⊆ S2.
Claim 1: S1 ⊆ 〈S2〉.
Proof: Let s1 ∈ S1. Let t := s1 + s2. Then t ∈ S, because s2 ∈ S and s1 ∈ S1 ⊂ S and
S is additively closed.
Note that t 6∈ S1 (Proof: s2 = t − s1, and s1 ∈ S1. So if t ∈ S1, then s2 ∈ 〈S1〉.
Contradiction.) Thus, t ∈ S \ S1 ⊆ S2. But s1 = t − s2. Thus, s1 ∈ 〈S2〉. This
argument works for all s1 ∈ S1. The claim follows. 3 Claim 1
Now,
〈S2〉 ⊆
(∗)
〈S〉
(†)
〈S1 ∪ S2〉 ⊆
(⋄)
〈〈S2〉 ∪ S2〉 = 〈S2〉,
where (∗) is because S2 ⊆ S, (†) is because S = S1 ∪ S2, and (⋄) is by Claim 1. We
conclude that 〈S〉 = 〈S2〉, as desired. 2
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Lemma B.6 Let (A,+) be an abelian group. Let S1, . . . ,SN ⊆ A be cones, and suppose
S := S1∪· · ·∪SN is additively closed. Then there exists n ∈ [1 . . . N ] such that 〈S〉 = 〈Sn〉.
Proof: (by induction on N) If N = 1, then S = S1, and the result is trivially true.
Now suppose N = K ≥ 2. By induction, suppose the theorem statement is true for
N = K − 1. If 〈S〉 = 〈SN〉, then we’re done. So, suppose 〈SN〉 ( 〈S〉. Then 〈SN〉
is a divisible proper subgroup of A. Corollary A.2(b) yields a complete, homogeneous
preorder () on A such that 〈SN〉 = {a ∈ A; a ≈ 0}.
Define S := {s ∈ S; s  0} and S := {s ∈ S; s  0}. Then S = S ∪ S, and S is
additively closed, so Lemma B.5 says that either 〈S〉 =
〈
S
〉
or 〈S〉 =
〈
S
〉
. Without
loss of generality, suppose 〈S〉 =
〈
S
〉
.
Define S≻ := {s ∈ S; s ≻ 0} and S0 := {s ∈ S; s ≈ 0} = S∩〈SN〉. Then S
 = S≻∪S0.
Also S is itself additively closed (because it is an intersection of two additively closed
sets) so Lemma B.5 says that either
〈
S
〉
= 〈S≻〉 or
〈
S
〉
= 〈S0〉. However, by
hypothesis,
〈
S
〉
= 〈S〉 ) 〈SN〉 = 〈〈SN〉〉 ⊇ 〈S ∩ 〈SN〉〉 = 〈S0〉. Thus,
〈
S
〉
6= 〈S0〉.
Thus,
〈
S
〉
= 〈S≻〉. Thus, 〈S〉 = 〈S≻〉.
For all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], define S≻n := {s ∈ Sn; s ≻ 0}. Then S
≻ = S≻1 ∪ · · · ∪ S
≻
N−1 ∪ S
≻
N ,
(because S = S1 ∪ · · · ∪ SN−1 ∪ SN). But S
≻
N = ∅ (because SN ⊆ S
0). Thus, S≻ =
S≻1 ∪ · · · ∪ S
≻
N−1. Furthermore, S
≻ is additively closed and S≻1 , . . . ,S
≻
N−1 are all cones
(because S is additively closed and S1, . . . ,SN−1 are cones, and the set {a ∈ A; a ≻ 0}
is itself a cone). Thus, the induction hypothesis yields some n ∈ [1 . . . N−1] such that
〈S≻〉 = 〈S≻n 〉. But then we have:
〈S〉 = 〈S≻〉 = 〈S≻n 〉 ⊆ 〈Sn〉 ⊆ 〈S〉.
We conclude that 〈Sn〉 = 〈S〉, as desired. 2
Theorem 2.3 follows from Theorem 2.2 and the next result:
Proposition B.7 Let R be a linearly ordered abelian group. Let X be a finite set, let V
be any set, let D ⊆ N〈V〉 be a cone, and let F : D ⇉ X be a balance rule determined by a
perfect R-valued balance system. Then F is neutral if and only if F is a scoring rule with
an R-valued neutral score system.
Proof: “⇐=” If the score function of F is neutral, then F itself is neutral.
“=⇒” Suppose F is a perfect R-valued balance system. If F is ΠX -neutral, then
Proposition B.3 says that F = FB, where B is a neutral, R-valued balance system.
First suppose |X | = 2. If X = {x, y}, then B = {bx,y,by,x}, where by,x = −bx,y. Thus,
if we define sx := bx,y and sy := 0, then F = FS.
Now suppose |X | ≥ 3. There are three cases: either |X | ≡ 0 or |X | ≡ 1 or |X | ≡ 2, mod
3. Refer to these as Cases 0, 1, and 2. Partition X as X = X0 ⊔X1 ⊔X2 ⊔ · · · ⊔ XN , (for
some N ≥ 0), where |Xn| = 3 for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], and where X0 = ∅ in Case 0, |X0| = 4
in Case 1, and |X0| = 5 in Case 2.
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Let Π˜X := {π˜; π ∈ ΠX} ⊆ ΠV . Then D is a Π˜X -invariant subset of N〈V〉, because F is
neutral. Let Φ ⊂ ΠX be the set of all permutations whose orbits are X0,X1, . . . ,XN . All
elements of Φ have the same order m.17 Let M := m − 1. For any φ ∈ Φ and d ∈ D,
define dφ := d+ φ˜(d)+ φ˜2(d)+ · · ·+ φ˜M(d); then dφ ∈ D also, because D is φ˜-invariant
and additively closed. Thus, FB(d
φ) 6= ∅. For all n ∈ [0 . . . N ], let Dφn := {d ∈ D;
Xn ⊆ FB(d
φ)}.
Claim 1: For any φ ∈ Φ and any n ∈ [0 . . . N ], the set Dφn is a cone.
Proof: (Additively closed) Let d1,d2 ∈ D
φ
n. We must show that d1 + d2 ∈ D
φ
n. By
hypothesis, Xn ⊆ FB(d
φ
1) and Xn ⊆ FB(d
φ
1). Thus, reinforcement implies that Xn ⊆
FB(d
φ
1 + d
φ
2). But d
φ
1 + d
φ
2 = (d1 + d2)
φ; thus Xn ⊆ FB((d1 + d2)
φ), which means
d1 + d2 ∈ D
φ
n.
(Divisible) Let z ∈ Z〈V〉 and m ∈ N, and suppose m z ∈ Dφn. We must show that
z ∈ Dφn. By hypothesis, Xn ⊆ FB((m z)
φ). But (m z)φ = m zφ. Thus, zφ ∈ D (because
D is a cone), and FB(m z
φ) = FB(z
φ), by reinforcement. Thus, Xn ⊆ FB(z
φ). Thus,
z ∈ Dφn. 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: For any φ ∈ Φ, we have D = Dφ0 ∪ D
φ
1 ∪ · · · ∪ D
φ
N .
Proof: For any d ∈ D, we have φ˜(dφ) = dφ. Thus neutrality implies that φ[FB(d
φ)] =
FB(d
φ). Thus, FB(d
φ) must be a union of φ-orbits. Thus, FB(d
φ) contains Xn for
some n ∈ [0 . . . N ]. Thus, d ∈ Dφn for some n ∈ [0 . . . N ]. 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: Suppose there exists some φ ∈ Φ and some n ∈ [1 . . . N ] such that
〈
Dφn
〉
=
〈D〉. For simplicity, suppose Xn = {1, 2, 3}, where φ(1) = 3, φ(2) = 1, and φ(3) = 2.
Then b1,2(d) + b2,3(d) = b1,3(d) for all d ∈ D.
Proof: For any d ∈ Dφn, we have Xn ⊆ FB(d
φ). Then we must have
0 = b1,2(dφ) = b1,2
(
d+ φ˜(d) + φ˜2(d) + · · ·+ φ˜M(d)
)
(⋄)
(
b1,2 + b1,2φ˜+ b1,2φ˜2 + · · ·+ b1,2φ˜M
)
(d)
(∗)
(
b1,2 + bφ
−1(1),φ−1(2) + · · ·+ bφ
−M (1),φ−M (2)
)
(d)
=
M + 1
3
(
b1,2 + b2,3 + b3,1
)
(d),
where (⋄) is by Lemma B.2(a), and (∗) is because B is neutral. But
〈
Dφn
〉
= 〈D〉, so
Lemma B.4 then implies that b1,2(d) + b2,3(d) + b3,1(d) = 0 for all d ∈ D. In other
words: b1,2(d) + b2,3(d) = −b3,1(d) = b1,3(d), as desired. 3 Claim 3
Claim 4: Suppose there exists no φ ∈ Φ and n ∈ [1 . . . N ] such that
〈
Dφn
〉
= 〈D〉.
Suppose that either X0 = {1, 2, 3, 4} (in Case 1), or X0 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} (in Case 2). Then
b1,2(d) + b2,3(d) = b1,3(d) for all d ∈ D.
17m = 3 in Case 0. If N = 0, then m = 4 in Case 1 and m = 5 in Case 2. If N ≥ 1, then m = 12 in
Case 1 and m = 15 in Case 2.
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Proof: For all φ ∈ Φ, if there is no n ∈ [1 . . . N ] such that
〈
Dφn
〉
= 〈D〉, then Claims 1
and 2 and Lemma B.6 imply that
〈
Dφ0
〉
= 〈D〉.
(Case 1) Let φ ∈ Φ, and suppose φ(2) = 1, φ(3) = 2, φ(4) = 3, and φ(1) = 4. Then
by an argument similar to Claim 3, we conclude that
(b1,2 + b2,3 + b3,4 + b4,1)(d) = 0, (B7)
for all d ∈ D. By choosing other permutations in Φ, we can similarly derive the
following five equations. For all d ∈ D,
(b1,2 + b2,4 + b4,3 + b3,1)(d) = 0, (B8)
(b2,3 + b3,1 + b1,4 + b4,2)(d) = 0, (B9)
(b2,3 + b3,4 + b4,1 + b1,2)(d) = 0, (B10)
(b3,1 + b1,2 + b2,4 + b4,3)(d) = 0, (B11)
and (b3,1 + b1,4 + b4,2 + b2,3)(d) = 0. (B12)
Recall that b2,4 = −b4,2, and b3,4 = −b4,3, etc. Thus, by adding equations (B7)-(B12)
together and cancelling, we obtain 4(b1,2 + b2,3 + b3,1)(d) = 0, for all d ∈ D. Thus,
b1,2(d) + b2,3(d) = −b3,1(d) = b1,3(d), as desired.
(Case 2) Let φ ∈ Φ, and suppose φ(2) = 1, φ(3) = 2, φ(4) = 3, φ(5) = 4, and
φ(1) = 5. Then by an argument similar to Claim 3, we conclude that
(b1,2 + b2,3 + b3,4 + b4,5 + b5,1)(d) = 0, (B13)
for all d ∈ D. By choosing other permutations in Φ, we can similarly derive the
following five equations. For all d ∈ D,
(b1,2 + b2,3 + b3,5 + b5,4 + b4,1)(d) = 0, (B14)
(b2,3 + b3,1 + b1,4 + b4,5 + b5,2)(d) = 0, (B15)
(b2,3 + b3,1 + b1,5 + b5,4 + b4,2)(d) = 0, (B16)
(b3,1 + b1,2 + b2,4 + b4,5 + b5,3)(d) = 0, (B17)
and (b3,1 + b1,2 + b2,5 + b5,4 + b4,3)(d) = 0, (B18)
By adding equations (B13)-(B18) together and cancelling, we obtain 4(b1,2 + b2,3 +
b3,1)(d) = 0, for all d ∈ D, Thus, b1,2(d) + b2,3(d) = b1,3(d), as desired. 3 Claim 4
In Case 0, we have D0 = ∅, so D = D1 ∪ · · · ∪ DN . Thus, Claims 1 and 2 and Lemma
B.6 yields some n ∈ [1 . . . N ] such that 〈Dn〉 = 〈D〉. Thus, Claim 3 applies. In Cases 1
or 2, either the hypothesis of Claim 3 holds or the hypothesis of Claim 4 holds. In any
of these cases, we obtain some distinct elements x, y, z ∈ X such that
bx,y(d) + by,z(d) = bx,z(d), for all d ∈ D. (B19)
Claim 5: For any x′, y′, z′ ∈ X , and all d ∈ D, we have bx
′,y′(d)+by
′,z′(d) = bx
′,z′(d).
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Proof: There exists some α ∈ ΠX such that α(x
′) = x, α(y′) = y, and α(z′) = z. Thus,
bx
′,y′(d) + by
′,z′(d)
(⋄)
(bx,yα˜)(d) + (by,zα˜)(d)
(†)
(bx,y + by,z) (α˜(d))
(∗)
bx,z (α˜(d))
(⋄)
bx
′,z′(d),
as desired. Here, (∗) is by eqn.(B19) (because α˜(d) ∈ D because D is Π˜X -invariant),
and (†) is by Lemma B.2(a), while both (⋄) are because B is neutral. 3 Claim 5
Now, Claim 5 and Lemma 5.1 imply that FB is a scoring rule. Finally, if FB is neutral,
then Proposition 3.1 says that FB has a neutral score function. 2
Proof of Theorem 2.3. “⇐=” It is easy to check that any scoring rule satisfies reinforce-
ment. If the score system of F is neutral, then F itself is neutral.
“=⇒” If F satisfies reinforcement, then Theorem 2.2 says F is a balance rule. If F is
neutral, then Proposition B.7 says F is scoring rule with a neutral score system. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.4. “⇐=” is straightforward.
“=⇒” By hypothesis, F = FeB for some balance system B˜ := {b˜
x,y}x,y∈X taking values in
some linearly ordered abelian group R˜. Fix x, y ∈ X . Let R′x,y := b˜
x,y(Z〈V〉) ⊆ R˜. Then
R′x,y is also a linearly ordered abelian group, and we can treat b˜
x,y as a homomorphism
from Z〈V〉 into R′x,y.
Claim 1: R′x,y := b˜
x,y(N〈V〉).
Proof: Let r ∈ R′x,y; then r = b˜
x,y(z) for some z ∈ Z〈V〉. Let W := {v ∈ V; zv 6= 0} (a
finite set). Condition (TC2) yields some n ∈ N〈V〉 with nw > 0 for all w ∈ W, such
that F (n) ⊇ {x, y}. Thus, bx,y(n) = 0, so n ∈ ker(b˜x,y). Thus, Mn ∈ ker(b˜x,y) for
all M ∈ N.
Let M = 1 + max{|zw|/nw; w ∈ W} (so M is finite, because |W| < ∞). Thus,
Mnw + zw > 0 for all w ∈ W. Thus, Mn + z ∈ N〈V〉, and clearly, b˜x,y(Mn + z) =
M · b˜x,y(n) + b˜x,y(z) = M · 0 + r = r, as desired. 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: R′x,y is Archimedean for all x, y ∈ X .
Proof: Let r1, r2 ∈ Rx,y, with r1 > 0. We must find some N ∈ N such that N · r1 > −r2.
By Claim 1, there exist n1,n2 ∈ NV such that r1 = b˜x,y(n1) and r2 = b˜x,y(n2).
Condition (TC1) yields some n0 ∈ NV such that F (n0) = {x, y}. By overwhelming
majority, there exists some M1,M2 ∈ N such that F (n1+M1n0) ⊆ {x, y} and F (n2+
M2n0) ⊆ {x, y}. For both j ∈ {1, 2}, define n
′
j := nj + Mjn0. Then b˜
x,y(n′j) =
b˜x,y(nj) + Mj · b˜
x,y(n0) = b˜
x,y(nj) = rj, because b˜
x,y(n0) = 0 because F (n0) =
{x, y}. Thus, F (n′1) = {x}, because b˜
x,y(n′1) = r1 > 0. By overwhelming majority,
there exists some N ∈ N such that F (N n′1 + n2) = {x}. But this means that
0 < b˜x,y(N n′1 + n2) = N b˜
x,y(n′1) + b˜
x,y(n′2) = N
′r1 + r2. Thus, N · r1 > −r2, as
desired. 3 Claim 2
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For all x, y ∈ X , Ho¨lder’s theorem and Claim 2 imply that R′x,y is isomorphic to some
ordered subgroup of R; thus, we can regard b˜x,y as a real-valued function, so that B˜ is
a real-valued balance system. 2
The proofs of Propositions 2.5 and 2.6 require three lemmas. A voting rule F : D ⇉ X is
trivial if F (d) = X for all d ∈ D; otherwise F is nontrivial. Recall that F is nondegenerate
if, for all x ∈ X , there is some d ∈ D with F (d) = {x}.
Lemma B.8 Suppose X is finite, and let D ⊆ N〈V〉 be a domain. If a voting rule F : D ⇉
X is neutral, nontrivial, and satisfies reinforcement, then F is nondegenerate.
Proof: Let N := |X | (finite).
Claim 1: Let d ∈ D, and let M := |X \ F (d)| (so |F (d)| = N −M).
(a) If |F (d)| ≤ N/2, then there exists d′ ∈ D with |F (d)| = 1.
(b) If |F (d)| > N/2, then there exists d′ ∈ D with |F (d′)| = N − 2M .
Proof: Let Y := F (d) ⊆ X . If |Y| ≤ |X |/2, then there exists some Y ′ ∈ X such that
|Y ′| = |Y| and |Y ∩ Y ′| = 1.
If |Y| > |X |/2, then there exists some Y ′ ∈ X such that |Y ′| = |Y| and X \ Y ′ is
disjoint from X \ Y , and thus,
|X \ (Y ′ ∩Y)| = |(X \Y ′)⊔ (X \Y)| = |X \Y ′|+ |X \Y| = 2|X \Y| = 2M.
Thus, |Y ′ ∩ Y| = |X | − 2M = N − 2M .
In either case, |Y ′| = |Y|, so there exists π ∈ ΠX with π(Y) = Y
′. Thus, F (π˜(d)) = Y ′,
by neutrality. Let d′ := d + π(d). By construction Y ′ ∩ Y 6= ∅; thus, d′ ∈ D and
F (d′) = Y ′ ∩ Y , by reinforcement. 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: There exists d′ ∈ D with |F (d′)| = 1.
Proof: Since F is nontrivial, there exists some d ∈ D with |F (d)| < N . Now applying
Claim 1(b) repeatedly, we can obtain some d′′ ∈ D with |F (d′′)| ≤ N/2. Then apply
Claim 1(a) to obtain some d′ ∈ D with |F (d′)| = 1. 3 Claim 2
Now, let d′ ∈ D be from Claim 2. Thus, F (d′) = {x} for some x ∈ X . Let y ∈ X . Find
π ∈ ΠX such that π(x) = y. Then F (π˜(d
′)) = π(F (d)) = {y}, by neutrality. This works
for any y ∈ X ; thus, F is nondegenerate. 2
Lemma B.9 Suppose X is finite, and let F : N〈V〉 ⇉ X be a voting rule.
(a) If F is neutral, then F satisfies (TC2) of the tie condition.
(b) If F is neutral, nontrivial, and satisfies reinforcement, then F satisfies (TC1).
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Proof: (a) Fix x, y ∈ X . Let W ⊆ V be finite, and define n ∈ N〈V〉 by nw := 1 for all
w ∈ W, while nv := 0 for all v ∈ V \W. Define n :=
∑
pi∈ΠX
π˜(n). Then n is Π˜X -fixed,
so neutrality implies that F (n) is a ΠX -invariant subset of X . Since F (n) 6= ∅, this
means that F (n) = X . In particular, {x, y} ⊆ F (n). Finally, for all w ∈ W, we have
nw ≥ nw = 1 ≥ 0, as required by (TC2).
(b) Theorem 2.3 says that F is a scoring rule with a neutral scoring system S. Lemma B.8
yields some n ∈ N〈V〉 with |F (n)| = 1. Let F (n) = {x}. Since X is finite, there exists
y ∈ X such that
sx(n) > sy(n) ≥ sz(n), for all z ∈ X \ {x, y}. (B20)
Let π ∈ ΠX be a permutation such that π(x) = y and π(y) = x. Since X is finite, there
is some M ∈ N such that πM = Id. Define n :=
∑M−1
m=0 π˜
m(n).
Claim 1: F (n) = {x, y}.
Proof: Let z ∈ X \ {x, y}. If m is even, then πm(x) = x and πm(y) = y. Thus,
sx(π˜m(n))
(∗)
(sxπ˜m)(n)
(†)
spi
−m(x)(n) = sx(n)
>
(⋄)
spi
−m(z)(n)
(†)
(szπ˜m)(n)
(∗)
sz(π˜m(n)),
and sy(π˜m(n))
(∗)
(syπ˜m)(n)
(†)
spi
−m(y)(n) = sy(n)
≥
(⋄)
spi
−m(z)(n)
(†)
(szπ˜m)(n)
(∗)
sz(π˜m(n)).

(B21)
Here, all four (∗) are by Lemma B.2(a), all four (†) are by neutrality, and both (⋄)
are by the inequalities (B20).
If m is odd, then πm(x) = y and πm(y) = x. Then by an argument very similar to
(B21), we have
sx(π˜m(n)) = sy(n) ≥ sz(π˜m(n)),
and sy(π˜m(n)) = sx(n) > sz(π˜m(n)).
}
(B22)
Note that M must be even. Observe that
sx(n) = sx
(
M−1∑
m=0
π˜m(n)
)
=
M−1∑
m=0
sx(π˜m(n)),
sy(n) = sy
(
M−1∑
m=0
π˜m(n)
)
=
M−1∑
m=0
sy(π˜m(n)),
and sz(n) = sz
(
M−1∑
m=0
π˜m(n)
)
=
M−1∑
m=0
sz(π˜m(n)).

(B23)
Applying the inequalities in (B21) and (B22) to the right hand side of the three
equations in (B23), we conclude that sx(n) = sy(n) > sz(n), for all z ∈ X \ {x, y}.
Thus, F (n) = {x, y}, as desired. 3 Claim 1
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Now, let x′, y′ ∈ X . Find π ∈ ΠX such that π(x) = x
′ and π(y) = y′. Then
F (π(n))
(N)
π[F (n)]
(∗)
π{x, y} = {x′, y′},
as desired. Here, (N) is by neutrality, and (∗) is by Claim 1. 2
The next lemma just extends Myerson’s (1995) result to the case when V is infinite.
Lemma B.10 Let X be a finite set, and let V be an arbitrary set. If a voting rule F :
N〈V〉 ⇉ X satisfies reinforcement and overwhelming majority, and is neutral and nontrivial,
then F = FS, where S is a neutral, real-valued score system on (X ,V).
Proof: If F : N〈V〉 ⇉ X satisfies reinforcement and is neutral and nontrivial, then Lemma
B.9 says that F satisfies the tie condition. If F also satisfies overwhelming majority, then
Proposition 2.4 says F is a real-valued balance rule. Since F is neutral, Proposition B.7
says that F = FS, where S is a neutral, real-valued score system. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.5. Lemma B.10 says that any neutral, nontrivial, X -valued voting
rule which satisfies reinforcement and overwhelming majority must be a scoring rule FS,
where S is a neutral, real-valued score system on (X ,V) (for some signal set V). For any
v ∈ V, let sv := (s
x
v), a vector in R
X . Let S† := {sv}v∈V ; then S
† ⊆ RX .
Claim 1: If FS is the most expressive scoring rule with S
† ⊆ RX , then S† = RX .
Proof: (by contradiction) Suppose that S† ( RX . Let r ∈ RX \ S†. Let w be some
new signal not in V . Define W := V ∪ {w}. Define the score system S˜ ⊂ RW by
setting s˜xv := s
x
v for all v ∈ V and x ∈ X , whereas s˜
x
w := r
x
w for all x ∈ X . Let
α : V−→W be the inclusion map; then for any n ∈ N〈V〉, and any x ∈ X it is clear
that s˜x[α∗(n)] = s
x(n). Thus, FeS[α∗(n)] = FS(n). Thus, FeS is at least as expressive
as FS. But this contradicts our hypothesis that FS is the most expressive rule with
S† ⊆ RX . 3 Claim 1
So, suppose S† = RX . For any v, w ∈ V, if sv = sw, then a vote for v has the same effect
as a vote for w, when added to any profile. Thus, we can regard v and w as the same.
Thus, for each r ∈ RX , there exists a unique v ∈ V with sv = r. At this point it is clear
that FS is the formally utilitarian voting rule. 2
The proof of Proposition 2.6 also requires the next lemma.
Lemma B.11 Let X be a finite set, and let S be a real-valued scoring system on X .
(a) Suppose there exists R ∈ R+ such that |sxv − s
y
v| ≤ R for all v ∈ V and x, y ∈ X .
Then FS does not admit minority overrides.
(b) Let Π′X be a transitive group of permutations on X , and suppose S is Π
′
X -neutral
and nontrivial. If S does not admit minority overrides, then there is some R ∈ R
such that |sxv − s
y
v| ≤ R for all v ∈ V and x, y ∈ X .
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Proof: (a) LetM := min{|FS(n)|; n ∈ N〈V〉} (soM ≥ 1). Find n ∈ N〈V〉 with |FS(n)| = M .
Fix x ∈ FS(n), and let δ := min{s
x(n)− sy(n); y ∈ X \ FS(n)}; then δ > 0 and is well-
defined because X is finite. Let K := ⌈R/δ⌉+1, and let n′ := K n; then FS(n
′) = FS(n),
by reinforcement.
Claim 1: For any v ∈ V, we have F (n′ + 1v) = F (n).
Proof: For any y ∈ X \ FS(n)}, we have
sy(n′ + 1v) = Ksy(n) + sy(1v) = Ksy(n) + syv
≤
(†)
Ksx(n)−Kδ + sxv +R <
(∗)
Ksx(n) + sxv = Ks
x(n) + sx(1v)
= sx(n′ + 1v).
(Here, (†) is because sy(n) ≤ sx(n) − δ (because y ∈ X \ FS(n)), while s
y
v ≤ s
x
v + R,
by definition of R. Next, (∗) is because Kδ > R, by definition of K.) Thus, y 6∈
F (n′+ 1v). This holds for all y ∈ X \FS(n), so we conclude that F (n
′+ 1v) ⊆ F (n′).
But then F (n′+1v) = F (n′), because F (n′) = M is already of minimal size. 3 Claim 1
Claim 1 shows that F does not admit minority overrides.
(b) (by contrapositive) Suppose that, for all R ∈ R, there exist v ∈ V and x, y ∈ X
with |sxv − s
y
v| > R. Since Π
′
X is transitive and S is Π
′
X -neutral, this means that, for all
R ∈ R and all x ∈ X , there exist v ∈ V and y ∈ X with syv − s
x
v > R. We will show that
F admits minority overrides.
Let n ∈ N〈V〉 be any profile with FS(n) 6= X . Fix x ∈ FS(n). Let R := max{sx(n)−sy(n);
y ∈ X \ FS(n)}; then R > 0 and is well-defined because X is finite. Now, find some
v ∈ V and y ∈ X with syv − s
x
v > R. There are now two cases: either y ∈ FS(n), or
y 6∈ FS(n).
Case 1. If y ∈ FS(n), then
sy(n+ 1v) = sy(n) + sy(1v) = sy(n) + syv (∗) s
x(n) + syv
>
(†)
sx(n) + sxv = s
x(n+ 1v).
Thus, x 6∈ FS(n+1
v), so FS(n+1
v) 6= FS(n). (Here (∗) is because s
y(n) = sx(n) because
{x, y} ∈ FS(n). Meanwhile, (†) is because s
y
v > s
x
v +R > s
x
v .)
Case 2. If y 6∈ F (n), then
sy(n+ 1v) = sy(n) + syv ≥ s
x(n)−R + syv
>
(†)
sx(n)−R +R + sxv = s
x(n) + sxv = s
x(n+ 1v).
Thus, again x 6∈ FS(n+ 1
v), so FS(n+ 1
v) 6= FS(n). (Here, (†) is because s
y
v > s
x
v +R.)
This construction works for any n ∈ N〈V〉; thus, FS admits minority overrides. 2
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Proof of Proposition 2.6. Lemma B.10 says that any neutral, nontrivial, X -valued voting
rule which satisfies reinforcement and overwhelming majority must be a scoring rule FS,
where S is a neutral, real-valued score system on (X ,V) (for some signal set V).
Claim 1: If FS does not admit minority overrides, then there is a real-valued scoring
system S˜ = {s˜x}x∈X with 0 ≤ s˜
x
v ≤ 1 for all x ∈ X and v ∈ V, such that FeS = FS.
Proof: Lemma B.11 says that F does not admit minority overrides if and only if there is
some R ∈ R+ such that |sxv − s
y
v| ≤ R for all v ∈ V and x, y ∈ X . Let r := 1/R; thus,
|r sxv − r s
y
v| ≤ 1 for all x, y ∈ X and v ∈ V. Now, for each v ∈ V, let tv := min{r s
x
v ;
x ∈ X}, to obtain a vector t := (tv)v∈V (this is well-defined because X is finite). Now
define s˜x := r sx − t, for all x ∈ X ; then S˜ is an affine transform of S, so FeS = FS.
Now, for any v ∈ V, we have min{s˜xv ; x ∈ X} = 0, by construction. Also, max{s˜
x
v−s˜
y
v;
x, y ∈ X} ≤ 1, which implies that max{s˜xv ; x ∈ X} ≤ 1. Thus, 0 ≤ s˜
x
v ≤ 1 for all
x ∈ X and v ∈ V. 3 Claim 1
By replacing S by S˜ from Claim 1 if necessary, we can assume without loss of generality
that s˜xv ∈ [0, 1] for all x ∈ X and v ∈ V. For any v ∈ V, define sv := (s
x
v), a vector in
[0, 1]X . Let S† := {sv}v∈V ; then S
† ⊆ [0, 1]X .
At this point, the argument is very similar to the proof of Proposition 2.5. By an
argument identical to Claim 1 in that proof, one can show: If FS is the most expressive
rule with S† ⊆ [0, 1]X , then S† = [0, 1]X . So, suppose S† = [0, 1]X . For any v, w ∈ V, if
sv = sw, then a vote for v has the same effect as a vote for w, when added to any profile.
Thus, we can regard v and w as the same. Thus, for each t ∈ [0, 1]X , there exists a
unique v ∈ V with sv = t. At this point it is clear that FS is the range voting rule. 2
The proof of Proposition 4.1 depends on Proposition 4.3, so we prove that first. The
proofs of Propositions 4.3 and 5.3 require some preliminaries. Let B = {bx,y}x,y∈X be a
real-valued balance system on (X ,V). For any x ∈ X , recall equation (2) defining
R
Cx.
Let Q+ := {q ∈ Q; q ≥ 0}. Let QCx := Q
V
+ ∩ RCx, and let Q+[D] := {be all Q+-linear
combinations of elements of D}. We also define
R
Cox := R+[D] \
⋃
y∈X\{x}
R
Cy. (B24)
Lemma B.12 Let X and V be finite, and let D ⊂ NV be a thick domain. Let x ∈ X .
(a)
R
Cox is a relatively open subset of R+[D], and is closed under multiplication by
positive real numbers.
(b) For any d ∈ D, we have (b1) (d ∈
R
Cx) ⇔ (x ∈ FS(d)) and (b2) (d ∈ RC
o
x) ⇔
(FS(d) = {x}).
(c) If
R
Cox 6= ∅, then (c1) RCx = cl(RC
o
x) and (c2) RCx = cl(QCx). (Here, “cl” denotes
the relative closure inside R+[D]).
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Proof: (a) For all y ∈ X , it is clear from defining equation (2) that
R
Cy is a relatively
closed subset of R+[D], and closed under positive scalar multiplication. Thus, the set
(
R
Cox)
∁ =
⋃
y∈X\{x} RCy is relatively closed (because X is finite), and also closed under
positive scalar multiplication. Thus, its complement
R
Cox is relatively open, and closed
under positive scalar multiplication.
(b1) (d ∈
R
Cx) ⇐⇒ (b
x,y(d) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ X ) ⇐⇒ (x ∈ FB(d)).
(b2) “=⇒” If d ∈
R
Cox, then d 6∈ RCy for any y 6= x. Thus, for all y 6= x, (b1) implies that
y 6∈ FB(d). But FB(d) 6= ∅, so we must have FB(d) = {x}.
“⇐=” Suppose FB(d) = {x}. Then for all y 6= x, we have y 6∈ FB(d), so (b1) implies
that d 6∈
R
Cy. Thus, d 6∈ (RC
o
x)
∁. But d ∈ R+[D]. Thus, d ∈ RC
o
x.
(c1) “⊇” Defining equation (2) implies that
R
Cx is relatively closed in R+[D]. Thus, it suffices
to show that
R
Cx ⊇ RC
o
x. This follows immediately from defining equation (B24) and the
next claim.
Claim 1: R+[D] =
⋃
x∈X
R
Cx.
Proof: D is additively closed (because it is thick); it is then easy to check that Q+[D] =
Q+ ·D. For all x ∈ X , let Cx := {d ∈ D; x ∈ FB(d)}; then Cx is also additively closed,
so it follows from (b1) that
Q
Cx = Q+ · Cx. Condition (1) implies D =
⋃
x∈X Cx. Thus,
Q+[D] = Q+ · D = Q+ ·
⋃
x∈X
Cx =
⋃
x∈X
(Q+ · Cx) =
⋃
x∈X
Q
Cx.
Thus, R+[D] = cl(Q+[D]) = cl
⋃
x∈X
Q
Cx
(∗)
⋃
x∈X
cl(
Q
Cx) ⊆
(†)
⋃
x∈X
R
Cx ⊆ R+[D],
where (∗) is because X is finite, and (†) is because cl(
Q
Cx) ⊆ RCx because QCx ⊂ RCx
and
R
Cx is relatively closed in R+[D]. 3 Claim 1
“⊆” The set R+[D] is convex with nonempty interior in RV (because D is thick). Part
(a) says that
R
Cox is relatively open in R+[D]. Thus, RC
o
x has nonempty interior in R
V .
Let q ∈
R
Cox be an element of this interior.
Claim 2: For all y ∈ X \ {x}, we have bx,y(q) > 0.
Proof: q is in the RV-interior of
R
Cox. Thus, if ǫ > 0 is small enough, then q− ǫb
x,y ∈
R
Cox.
Thus, Claim 1 implies that q − ǫbx,y ∈
R
Cx. Thus, equation (2) says 0 ≤ b
x,y(q −
ǫbx,y) = bx,y(q)− ǫbx,y(bx,y) = bx,y(q)− ǫ ‖bx,y‖2. Thus, bx,y(q) ≥ ǫ ‖bx,y‖2 > 0, as
desired. 3 Claim 2
Now, let r ∈
R
Cx. For all n ∈ N, let rn := (n−1n )r +
1
n
q; then rn ∈ R+[D] because
R+[D] is convex. For all y ∈ X , equation (2) says that bx,y(r) ≥ 0, while Claim 2 says
bx,y(q) > 0. Thus, bx,y(rn) = (
n−1
n
)bx,y(r) + 1
n
bx,y(q) > 0. Thus, equation (2) says
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rn 6∈ RCy for all y ∈ X \ {x}; thus, equation (B24) says rn ∈ RC
o
x. But clearly, rn−−−−n→∞→r.
Thus, r is a cluster point of
R
Cox.
This argument works for any r ∈
R
Cx. Thus, RCx ⊆ cl(RC
o
x).
(c2) “⊇” holds because
R
Cx is relatively closed in R+[D], and RCx ⊇ QCx.
“⊆” Q+[D] is dense in R+[D]. Part (a) says that RC
o
x is relatively open in R+[D]. Thus,
Q
Cox := Q+[D] ∩ RC
o
x is dense in RC
o
x. Thus, cl(RC
o
x) = cl(QC
o
x). But cl(RC
o
x) = RCx by (c1),
while cl(
Q
Cox) ⊆ cl(QCx). Thus, RCx ⊆ cl(QCx). 2
Lemma B.13 Let X and V be finite sets, and let D ⊆ NV be a thick domain. Let B and B˜
be real-valued balance systems on X . Suppose FB is nondegenerate. For every x ∼B y ∈ X ,
suppose there is some scalar rx,y > 0 such that b˜
x,y = rx,y · b
x,y. Then FB = FeB on D.
Proof:
Claim 1: For all x ∈ X , we have
R
Cx := {r ∈ R+[D]; bx,y(r) ≥ 0 for all y ∼B x}.
Proof: Let C′ := {r ∈ R+[D]; bx,y(r) ≥ 0 for all y ∼B x}. Let ∂RCx be the topological
boundary of
R
Cx as a relatively closed subset of R+[D]. Then
∂
R
Cx = RCx ∩
⋃
y∈X\{x}
R
Cy =
⋃
y∈X\{x}
Bx,y =
(A)︷ ︸︸ ︷⋃
y ∼
B
x
Bx,y ∪
(B)︷ ︸︸ ︷⋃
y
6∼
B
x
Bx,y .
Now, the union (B) is nowhere dense in ∂
R
Cx, because it is a finite union of sets of
codimension 2 or more. Thus, the union (A) must be dense in ∂
R
Cx. Since it is a finite
union of closed sets, (A) is also closed. Thus, (A) must be all of ∂
R
Cx. Thus, RCx is the
intersection of R+[D] with all halfspaces which are bounded by a hyperplane tangent
to one of the faces in (A). But this set is just C′. 3 Claim 1
Define
R
C˜x := {r ∈ RV+; b˜x,y(r) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ X}, and RC˜
o
x := R+[D] \
⋃
y∈X\{x}
R
C˜y.
Claim 2: For any x ∈ X , we have
R
C˜x ⊆ RCx.
Proof: Let r ∈ R+[D]. If r ∈ RC˜x, then b˜
x,y(r) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ X , and in particular, for
all y ∼
B
x. This means that bx,y(r) = b˜x,y(r)/rx,y ≥ 0 for all y ∼B x (because rx,y > 0);
thus Claim 1 says that r ∈
R
Cx. 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: For any x ∈ X , we have
R
C˜x ⊇ RCx.
Proof: We have
R
C˜ox := R+[D] \
⋃
y∈X\{x}
R
C˜y ⊇(⋄) R+[D] \
⋃
y∈X\{x}
R
Cy =: RC
o
x. (B25)
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(Here, (⋄) is by Claim 2.) By hypothesis, FB is nondegenerate. Thus, Lemma B.12(b2)
implies that
R
Cox 6= ∅. Thus, (B25) implies that RC˜
o
x 6= ∅. Thus, Lemma B.12(c1) says
that
R
C˜x = cl(RC˜
o
x) and RCx = cl(RC
o
x). But then (B25) implies that RC˜x ⊇ RCx. 3 Claim 3
For all x ∈ X , Claims 2 and 3 imply that
R
C˜x = RCx. Thus, for all d ∈ D we have:(
x ∈ FB(d)
)
⇐
(∗)
⇒
(
d ∈
R
Cx
)
⇐⇒
(
d ∈
R
C˜x
)
⇐
(∗)
⇒
(
x ∈ FeB(d)
)
,
where both (∗) are by Lemma B.12(b1). Thus, FB = FeB, as desired. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.3. “⇐=” follows immediately from Lemma B.13.
“=⇒” For any x ∈ X , let
Q
C˜x := QV+ ∩ RC˜x. For all y ∈ X , define B˜x,y := RC˜x ∩ RC˜y.
Claim 1: For all x ∈ X ,
Q
Cx = QC˜x.
Proof: Let q ∈ Q+[D]. Since D is additively closed, there exists N ∈ N with Nq ∈ D.
Then(
q ∈
R
Cx
)
⇐
(∗)
⇒
(
Nq ∈
R
Cx
)
⇐
(⋄)
⇒
(
x ∈ FB(Nq)
)
⇐
(†)
⇒
(
x ∈ FeB(Nq)
)
⇐
(⋄)
⇒
(
Nq ∈
R
C˜x
)
⇐
(∗)
⇒
(
q ∈
R
C˜x
)
.
Here, both (∗) is by Lemma B.12(a), while both (⋄) are by Lemma B.12(b1). Finally
(†) is because FB = FeB on D. 3 Claim 1
Now, FB is nondegenerate, and FB = FeB by hypothesis, so FeB also is nondegenerate.
Thus, for all x ∈ X , Lemma B.12(b2) implies that
R
Cox 6= ∅ 6= RC˜
o
x. Thus, Lemma B.12(c2)
says that
R
Cx = cl(QCx), and RC˜x = cl(QC˜x). Thus, Claim 1 implies that RCx = RC˜x for all
x ∈ X . This implies that B˜x,y = Bx,y for all x, y ∈ X .
Now suppose x ∼
B
y. Then bx,y 6= 0 and b˜x,y 6= 0, because B and B˜ have no zeros. Let
Hx,y := {r ∈ RV ; bx,y(r) = 0} and H˜x,y := {r ∈ RV ; b˜x,y(r) = 0}; then Hx,y and
H˜x,y are hyperplanes, and clearly Bx,y ⊆ Hx,y and B˜x,y ⊆ H˜x,y. But x ∼B y, so Bx,y is
hyperplanar; thus, Hx,y must be the unique hyperplane containing Bx,y. As we have
established that Bx,y = B˜x,y ⊆ H˜x,y, it follows that H˜x,y = Hx,y, which means that there
is some rx,y > 0 such that b˜
x,y = rx,yb
x,y. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.4. “⇐=” is a straightforward computation.
“=⇒” Let B := ∇S and B˜ := ∇S˜. Then FB = FS and FeB = FeS (see Example 2.1(a)).
Claim 1: Suppose FS is nondegenerate. Then for all x, y, z ∈ X , the vectors b
x,y and
by,z are linearly independent in RV .
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Proof: (by contradiction) Since B := ∇S, it is a perfect balance system, and satisfies
equation (3) for all d ∈ D. Suppose bx,y = rby,z for some r ∈ R. We will consider
three cases: either r ≥ 0, or r ≤ −1, or −1 < r < 0.
Case 1. Suppose r ≥ 0. Then for all d ∈ D, we have(
y ∈ FB(d)
)
=⇒
(
by,z(d) ≥ 0
)
=⇒
(
bx,y(d) ≥ 0)
)
(∗)
=⇒
(
x ∈ FB(d) also
)
.
(Here, (∗) is because B is perfect.) Thus, there does not exist any d ∈ D with
FB(d) = {y}, contradicting nondegeneracy.
Case 2. Suppose r ≤ −1. Then (1 + r) ≤ 0, and
bx,z
(∗)
bx,y + by,z = rby,z + by,z = (1 + r)by,z,
where (∗) is by equation (3). Thus, for all d ∈ D, we have(
z ∈ FB(d)
)
=⇒
(
by,z(d) ≤ 0
)
=⇒
(
bx,z(d) ≥ 0)
)
(∗)
=⇒
(
x ∈ FB(d) also
)
.
(Here, (∗) is because B is perfect.) Thus, there does not exist any d ∈ D with
FB(d) = {z}, contradicting nondegeneracy.
Case 3. Now suppose −1 < r < 0. Then 1
r
< −1, so 1 + 1
r
< 0. Also, by,z = 1
r
bx,y;
thus,
bx,z
(∗)
bx,y + by,z = bx,y +
1
r
bx,y =
(
1 +
1
r
)
bx,y,
where (∗) is by equation (3). Thus, for all d ∈ D, we have(
x ∈ FB(d)
)
=⇒
(
bx,y(d) ≥ 0
)
=⇒
(
bx,z(d) ≤ 0)
)
(∗)
=⇒
(
z ∈ FB(d) also
)
.
(Here, (∗) is because B is perfect.) Thus, there does not exist any d ∈ D with
FB(d) = {x}, contradicting nondegeneracy. 3 Claim 1
The rule FS (= FeS) is nondegenerate, so s
x 6= sy and s˜x 6= s˜y for all distinct x, y ∈ X .
This implies that B and B˜ have no zeros. Thus, if FS = FeS, then Proposition 4.3 says
that, for all x ∼
S
y in X , there is some rx,y > 0 such that b˜
x,y = rx,y b
x,y
Claim 2: Let x, y, z ∈ X . If (x ∼
S
y) ≡ (y ∼
S
z), then rx,y = ry,z = rx,z.
Proof: By hypothesis, x ∼
S
y ∼
S
z ∼
S
x. Thus,
rx,yb
x,y + ry,zb
y,z = b˜x,y + b˜y,z
(∗)
b˜x,z = rx,zb
x,z
(∗)
rx,z(b
x,y + by,z),
where both (∗) are by equation (3). Thus, (rx,y − rx,z)b
x,y + (ry,z − rx,z)b
y,z = 0.
But Claim 1 says that bx,y and by,z are linearly independent. Thus, we must have
(rx,y − rx,z) = 0 and (ry,z − rx,z) = 0. 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: There is some r > 0 such that (s˜x − s˜z) = r (sx − sz) for all x, z ∈ X .
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Proof: For any w, x, y, z ∈ X , if (w ∼
S
x) ∼= (y ∼
S
z), then iterating Claim 2 yields rw,x =
ry,z. But S is simple; thus, there exists r > 0 such that ry,y′ = r for all y ∼S y
′ ∈ X .
Now, let x, z ∈ X , and let x = y0 ∼S y1
∼
S
y2 ∼S · · ·
∼
S
yN = z be a path connecting x to
z. For all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], we have (s˜yn−1 − s˜yn) = r (syn−1 − syn). Thus,
s˜x − s˜z = s˜y0 − s˜yN = s˜y0 − s˜y1 + s˜y1 − s˜y2 + s˜y2 − s˜y3 + · · ·+ s˜yN−1 − s˜yN
= r(sy0 − sy1) + r(sy1 − sy2) + r(sy2 − sy3) + · · ·+ r(syN−1 − syN )
= r (sy0 − sy1 + sy1 − sy2 + sy2 − sy3 + · · ·+ syN−1 − syN ) = r(sy0 − syN )
= r(sx − sz),
as desired. 3 Claim 3
Now, let y ∈ X be arbitrary, and define t := s˜y − r sy. Then for all x ∈ X , we have:
s˜x = s˜x − s˜y + s˜y
(∗)
s˜x − s˜y + r sy + t
(†)
r (sx − sy) + r sy + t = r sx + t.
Thus, S˜ is an affine transform of S. Here, (∗) is because s˜y = r sy + t, and (†) is by
Claim 3. 2
The proof of Proposition 4.1 requires three more preliminary lemmas. Let (X ,∼) be a
graph (that is: X is a set of ‘vertices’, and ∼ is a binary relation on X —e.g. the relation
defined prior to Proposition 4.1.) A pair x ∼ y is called an edge. A circuit in (X ,∼) is a
closed path x0 ∼ x1 ∼ x2 ∼ · · · ∼ xN ∼ x0, where x0, x1, x2, . . . , xN ∈ X and N ≥ 3, and
no edge appears twice. A cut edge is an edge whose removal disconnects the graph.
Lemma B.14 Let (X ,∼) be a connected graph. The following are equivalent.
(a) (X ,∼) has no cut edges.
(b) Every edge is part of a circuit.
(c) Any two edges in the graph are part of a common circuit.
A connected graph is multiply connected if it satisfies any (hence all) of the conditions of
Lemma B.14. For example: the graphs of the voting rules in Figures 2(a,b,c) and 1(b,c)
are multiply connected, but the one in Figure 1(a) is not.
Proof of Lemma B.14. “(c) =⇒ (b)” is immediate.
“(a) =⇒ (c)” Let w, x, y, z ∈ X and suppose (w ∼ x) and (y ∼ z). We must construct
a circuit containing both edges. First, remove the edge (w ∼ x) from the graph. By
hypothesis, the graph is still connected. Thus, there exists a path px,y from x to y which
avoids (w ∼ x). There also exists a path pz,w from z to w which avoids (w ∼ x). Now,
join together (w ∼ x), px,y, (y ∼ z), and pz,w to get a circuit which starts and ends at
w and includes the edges (w ∼ x) and (y ∼ z).
“(b) =⇒ (a)” (by contradiction) Suppose (x ∼ y) is a cut edge. If we remove it, then
the remaining graph is disconected; x must be in one connected component, and y in
another. This means there is no path from x to y that does not go through (x ∼ y).
Thus, there is no circuit containing (x ∼ y). Contradiction. 2
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Lemma B.15 Let (X ,∼) be a connected graph, with |X | ≥ 3. Let Π′X be a group of
automorphisms of the graph such that every element of Π′X has finite order, and Π
′
X acts
transitively on X . Then (X ,∼) is multiply connected.
Proof: First, observe that every vertex has degree 2 or more. (Proof: Suppose some vertex
had degree 1. Then the transitive action of Π′X implies that every vertex has degree 1.
But then (X ,∼) cannot be connected, because |X | ≥ 3. Contradiction.)
Now, let (x ∼ y) be an edge in (X ,∼). We will show that (x ∼ y) is part of a circuit.
Since y has degree at least 2, we have y ∼ z for some z 6= x. Find some π ∈ Π′X with
π(x) = z. Define xn := π
n(x) and yn := π
n(y) for all n ∈ N. (Thus, x0 = x and x1 = z.)
Then for all n ∈ N, we have xn ∼ yn ∼ xn+1, because π is an automorphism of (X ,∼) by
Claim 2. Since π has finite order, there exists some n such that πn = Id, which means
xn = x0. Thus, we have a circuit.
Thus, every edge is part of a circuit. Thus, Lemma B.14 says (X ,∼) is multiply con-
nected. 2
Lemma B.16 Let X and V be finite sets, and let S be a nondegenerate real-valued score
system on (X ,V), such that the score vectors {sx}x∈X are linearly independent in RV , and
the graph of FS is multiply connected. Let S˜ be another real-valued score system on (X ,V).
Then FS = FeS if and only if S˜ is an affine transform of S.
Proof of Lemma B.16. “⇐=” is a straightforward computation.
“=⇒” Suppose S = {sx}x∈X ⊂ RV and S˜ = {s˜x}x∈X ⊂ RV . Define ∇S and ∇S˜ as in
Example 2.1(a); then ∇S and ∇S˜ are real-valued perfect balance rules. Also, FS (= FeS)
is nondegenerate, so sx 6= sy and s˜x 6= s˜y for all distinct x, y ∈ X . Thus, ∇S and ∇S˜
have no zeros, and are nondegenerate. Thus, for any x, y ∈ X , if x ∼
S
y, then Proposition
4.3 yields some real number rx,y > 0 such that (s˜
x − s˜y) = rx,y (s
x − sy).
Claim 1: If x0 ∼S x1
∼
S
x2 ∼S · · ·
∼
S
xN ∼S x0 is any circuit in (X ,
∼
S
), then rx0,x1 =
rx1,x2 = · · · = rxN−1,xN = rxN ,x0 .
Proof: We have
(rx0,x1 − rxN ,x0) s
x0 + (rx1,x2 − rx0,x1) s
x1 + (rx2,x3 − rx1,x2) s
x2 + · · ·+ (rxN ,x0 − rxN−1,xN ) s
xN
= rx0,x1 s
x0 + (rx1,x2 − rx0,x1) s
x1 + (rx2,x3 − rx1,x2) s
x2 + · · ·
· · ·+ (rxN ,x0 − rxN−1,xN ) s
xN − rxN ,x0 s
x0
= rx0,x1 (s
x0 − sx1) + rx1,x2 (s
x1 − sx2) + rx2,x3 (s
x2 − sx3) + · · ·+ rxN ,x0 (s
xN − sx0)
= (s˜x0 − s˜x1) + (s˜x1 − s˜x2) + (s˜x2 − s˜x3) + · · ·+ (s˜xN−1 − s˜xN ) + (s˜xN − s˜x0)
= (s˜x0 − s˜x0) + (s˜x1 − s˜x1) + (s˜x2 − s˜x2) + · · ·+ (s˜xN−1 − s˜xN−1) + (s˜xN − s˜xN ) = 0.
But the set {sx0 , sx1 , . . . , sxN} is linearly independent by hypothesis. Thus, we must
have (rx0,x1 − rxN ,x0) = (rx1,x2 − rx0,x1) = · · · = (rxN ,x0 − rxN−1,xN ) = 0. The claim
follows. 3 Claim 1
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Claim 2: For all w, x, y, z ∈ X , if w ∼
S
x and y ∼
S
z, then rw,x = ry,z.
Proof: The graph (X , ∼
S
) is multiply connected, so Lemma B.14 yields a circuit contain-
ing the edges (w ∼
S
x) and (y ∼
S
z). Thus, Claim 1 implies that rw,x = ry,z. 3 Claim 2
Claim 2 implies that there is some r > 0 such that ry,y′ = r for all y ∼S y
′ ∈ X . Now,
by an argument very similar to the proof of Claim 3 in the proof of Proposition 4.4, we
deduce that (s˜x − s˜z) = r (sx − sz) for all x, z ∈ X . From this point, the proof is the
same as the proof of Proposition 4.4. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.1. (a) “⇐=” is a straightforward computation.
“=⇒” Recall that FS is Π
′
X -neutral.
Claim 1: If π ∈ Π′X , then π is an automorphism of the graph (X ,
∼
S
).
Proof: Define B := ∇S in Example 2.1(a); then B is a real-valued, perfect balance rule.
For any x ∈ X define
R
Cx as in equation (2). The domain NV is thick. Thus, we can
apply Lemma B.12(c2).
Now, let x ∈ X . Then for all n ∈ N〈V〉, neutrality implies that x ∈ F (n) if and
only if π(x) ∈ F (π˜(n)). Thus, π˜(Cx) = Cpi(x). By an argument similar to the proof
of Claim 1 in the proof of Proposition 4.3, we deduce that π˜(
Q
Cx) = QCpi(x). By
hypothesis, FS is nondegenerate. Thus, Lemma B.12(b2) implies that RC
o
x 6= ∅. Then
Lemma B.12(c2) says cl(
Q
Cx) = RCx, Thus, cl[π˜(QCx)] = π(RCx), because π˜ is continuous.
Likewise Lemma B.12(b2,c2) also imply that cl(
Q
Cpi(x)) = RCpi(x). Thus, we conclude
that π(
R
Cx) = RCpi(x).
Thus, for any y ∈ X , we have π˜(Bx,y) = π˜(RCx ∩ RCy) = RCpi(x) ∩ RCpi(y) = Bpi(x),pi(y).
Thus, Bpi(x),pi(y) is hyperplanar if and only if Bx,y is hyperplanar (because π˜ is a linear
map). In other words, x ∼
S
y if and only if π(x) ∼
S
π(y). 3 Claim 1
By hypothesis, Π′X is transitive. Thus, Claim 1 and Lemma B.15 imply that the graph
(X , ∼
S
) is multiply connected. Then Lemma B.16 says that S˜ is an affine transform of
S.
(b) Suppose S and S˜ are Π′X -neutral. Let π ∈ Π
′
X . Let y ∈ X and let x := π(y). Then
rsy + t
(∗)
s˜y
(†)
s˜xπ˜
(∗)
(rsx + t)π˜ = rsxπ˜ + tπ˜
(⋄)
rsy + tπ˜.
Cancelling rsy from both sides, we get t = tπ˜. This holds for all π ∈ Π′X . (Here, (∗)
is because S˜ is an affine transform of S, while (†) is because S˜ is Π′X -neutral, and (⋄) is
because S is Π′X -neutral.) 2
Proof of Proposition 5.3. Fix o ∈ X . For any x ∈ X , a path from o to x is a chain c ∈ ZE
such that (∂c)o = −1, (∂c)x = 1, and (∂c)z = 0 for all z ∈ X \ {o, x}.
Claim 1: For any x ∈ X and any two paths c1, c2 from o to x, we have B(c1) = B(c2).
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Proof: Observe that c1 − c2 is a cycle. Thus, B(c1) − B(c2) = B(c1 − c2) = 0 by
hypothesis. Thus, B(c1) = B(c2). 3 Claim 1
Now, for any x ∈ X , let c be a path from o to x. Define sx := B(c). (Claim 1 implies that
sx is well-defined, independent of the path c). This yields a score system S := {sx}x∈X .
Define∇S, as in Example 2.1(a); then FS = F∇S, and∇S is a real-valued balance system.
Claim 2: For any x ∼
B
y ∈ X , we have ∇x,yS = bx,y.
Proof: Let c1 be a path from o to x, and let c2 be a path from o to y. Then the chain
c := c2 + [y, x]− c1 is a cycle. Thus, B(c) = 0 by hypothesis. Then we have
0 = B(c) = B(c2)− B(c1) + B([y, x])
= sx − sy + by,x = ∇x,yS− bx,y.
Thus, ∇x,yS = bx,y, as desired. 3 Claim 2
By hypothesis, B is a nondegenerate, real-valued balance system. Thus, Lemma B.13
and Claim 2 imply that FB = F∇S. Meanwhile, Example 2.1(a) observes that F∇S = FS.
Thus, FB = FS, so FB is a scoring rule. 2
Appendix C: Uniqueness of arbitrary balance rules
Let R and R˜ be two linearly ordered abelian groups. A function α : R−→R˜ is an order-
preserving group homomorphism if, for all r, s ∈ R, we have α(r + s) = α(r) + α(s), and
also, α(r) ≥ α(s) if and only if r ≥ s. We say α is strictly order-preserving if we have
α(r) > α(s) if and only if r > s. (Equivalently: α is injective.)
Example C.1. (a) Suppose R and R˜ are subgroups of R, with the standard ordering.
Then a map α : R−→R˜ is an order-preserving group homomorphism if and only if α is
multiplication by a nonnegative real number. (See below for proof.)
(b) Let R2 have the lexicographical order from Example 2.7. Define α : R2−→R by
α(x1, x2) = x1. Then α is a non-strictly order-preserving group homomorphism. ♦
Let b ∈ RV , and let Rb ⊆ R be the subgroup of R generated by the elements {bv}v∈V ;
then Rb is also a linearly ordered abelian group. A vector b˜ ∈ R˜
V is called a (strict)
rescaling of b if there exists a (strictly) order-preserving group homomorphism α : Rb−→R˜
such that b˜v = α(bv) for all v ∈ V. (For example: if b, b˜ ∈ RV , then b˜ is a rescaling of b
if and only if b˜ = r b for some nonnegative r ∈ R.) If B and B˜ are two balance systems,
and b˜x,y is a strict rescaling of bx,y for all x, y ∈ X , then it easy to see that FB = FeB.
Suppose a voting rule F : D ⇉ X satisfies reinforcement. Then for any x ∈ X , the set
Cx := {d ∈ D; x ∈ F (d)} is closed under addition. For any y ∈ X , we define Px,y to be
the smallest divisible subset of Z〈V〉 which contains Cx − Cy. Observe that Cx ⊆ Px,y and
−Cy ⊆ Px,y (because 0 ∈ Cy and 0 ∈ Cx). Also, Px,y is closed under addition (because Cx
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Figure 2: Here, as in Figure 1, we project R3+ onto the unit simplex. (a) Gx,y and Gy,x. (b,c)
Balance rules without unique representations; see Example C.4.
and Cy are), but not necessarily under negation. Indeed, −Px,y = Py,x. We write “x ≍F y”
if Z〈V〉 = Px,y ∪ Py,x. For any x ∈ X , let XF (x) := {y ∈ X ; x ≍F y}. A balance system B˜
representing F is fine if, for all d ∈ D and all x ∈ X , we have(
x ∈ FeB(d)
)
⇐⇒
(
b˜x,y(d) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ XF (x)
)
.
(In particular, if x ≍
F
y for all x, y ∈ X , then B˜ is fine.)
Example C.2. Let Bx,y := Cx ∩ Cy = {n ∈ N〈V〉; {x, y} ⊆ F (n)}. Let 〈Bx,y〉 be the
smallest divisible subgroup of Z〈V〉 which contains Bx,y. Suppose Z〈V〉/〈Bx,y〉 is isomorphic
to a subgroup of Q (heuristically, this means Bx,y spans a ‘hyperplane’ in Z〈V〉), and also
suppose that (Cx ∪ Cy) 6⊆ 〈Bx,y〉. Then x ≍F y. (See below for proof.) ♦
For any x, y ∈ X , define Gx,y := {c ∈ Cx \ Cy; b
y,z(cx) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ XF (y) \ {x}}. That
is: Gx,y is the set of elements c ∈ Cx which are excluded from Cy only because b
x,y(c) > 0
(none of the other balance constraints excludes c from Cy). See Figure 2(a). Now define
Qx,y := Gx,y−Cy. Note thatQy,x = −Qx,y. Write “x ≈B y” if Z
〈V〉 = (Px,y∩Py,x)∪Qx,y∪Qy,x.
Note that (x ≈
B
y) =⇒ (x ≍
F
y) (because Qx,y ⊆ Px,y, because Gx,y ⊆ Cx).
Proposition C.3 Let D ⊆ N〈V〉 be a domain, and suppose F : D ⇉ X satisfies reinforce-
ment. Then F = FB, for a perfect balance system B with the following properties:
(a) For any other balance system B˜ with F = FeB, and for all x, y ∈ X , if x
≍
F
y, then
b˜x,y is a rescaling of bx,y.
(b) Suppose B˜ is fine. For any x, y ∈ X , if x ≈
B
y, then b˜x,y is a strict rescaling of
bx,y.
(c) Suppose x ≈
B
y for all x, y ∈ X . Then F = FeB if and only if b˜
x,y is a strict
rescaling of bx,y for all x, y ∈ X .
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Example C.4. To see the need for the hypotheses of Proposition C.3, let X = {s, t, x, y, z},
and V = {1, 2, 3} (so that N〈V〉 = N3), and consider the balance rules shown in Figures
2(b,c). In both figures, we have t 6≍
F
y, so the vector bt,y is not uniquely determined up to
rescaling. Indeed, if we replaced bt,y with any other vector b˜t,y such that ker(b˜t,y)∩Ct = {0}
and ker(b˜t,y) ∩ Cy = {0} (as shown in Figure 2(b)), then we would obtain a new balance
system B˜ with FeB = FB.
On the other hand, both Figures (b) and (c) have x ≍
F
y ≍
F
z ≍
F
t ≍
F
x ≍
F
z. Thus, if B˜ is any
balance system with FeB = FB, then Proposition C.3(a) says that b˜
x,y is a rescaling of bx,y,
and b˜y,z is a rescaling of by,z, and b˜z,t is a rescaling of bz,t, and b˜t,x is a rescaling of bt,x,
and b˜x,z is a rescaling of bx,z.
However, some rescalings might not to be strict. For example, in Figure 2(b), we have
bt,x = bz,x = bz,y (as indicated by the fact the three boundaries Ct ∩ Cx, Cz ∩ Cx, and
Cz ∩ Cy are coplanar). Thus, the boundary between Cz and Cx is effectively ‘enforced’ by
bt,x and bz,y, so the vector bz,x is redundant. Thus, x 6≈
B
z, so b˜z,x need not be a strict
rescaling of bz,x. Indeed, we could even set b˜z,x = 0 (and keep all other entries of B˜ the
same as B), and we would still obtain FeB = FB. Or, we could set both of b˜
t,x and b˜z,y to
0 at the same time; if we also set b˜t,y := b˜z,x := bz,x (and keep all other entries in B˜ the
same as in B), then we will again have FeB = FB.
In Figure 2(c), we could set b˜s,x := b˜t,y := bt,x and set b˜t,x := 0 and keep all other entries
of B˜ the same as B, and obtain FeB = FB. Or, we could set b˜
x,s := b˜w,y := bx,y and b˜x,y := 0
and keep all other entries the same, and obtain FeB = FB. Thus, either b˜
t,x or b˜x,y can
be set to 0, while still obtaining an equivalent balance rule. Note these ‘trivial’ rescalings
are possible even though t ≈
B
x and x ≈
B
y; this shows that the “ ≈
B
” relation alone is not
enough to guarantee strict rescaling. These trivial rescalings are excluded if B˜ is fine. ♦
Proof of Example C.1(a). Without loss of generality, suppose R˜ := f(R).
Claim 1: Either R is a discrete subgroups of R, or R is dense in R.
Proof: For any r ∈ R, define ǫ(r) := inf{|r− s|; s ∈ R \ {r}}. Because R is a group, it
is easy to check that there is some ǫ ≥ 0 such that ǫ(r) = ǫ for all r ∈ R. Now, either
ǫ > 0 (so R is discrete) or ǫ = 0 (so R is dense).) 3 Claim 1
Claim 1 leaves us with two cases.
Case 1. (R is discrete) In this case, there exists some g ∈ R+ such that R = {z g;
z ∈ Z}. Let s := f(g)/g. Then s > 0, because f(g) > 0 because g > 0. For all z ∈ Z, it
is easy to check that f(z g) = z f(g) = z g s. That is: f(r) = s r for all r ∈ R.
Case 2. (R is dense) If f : R−→R˜ is an order-preserving homomorphism, then f
is nondecreasing. For all s ∈ R, define f(s) := sup{f(r); r ∈ R and r ≤ s} and
f(s) := inf{f(r); r ∈ R and r ≥ s}.
Claim 2: f and f are group homomorphisms from R to R.
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Proof: Let s1, s2 ∈ R. Let s := s1 + s2. For any r ∈ R, we have r ≤ s if and only if
r = r1 + r2 for some r1, r2 ∈ R with r1 ≤ s1 and r2 ≤ s2. Thus,
f(s) = sup {f(r) ; r ∈ R and r ≤ s}
= sup {f(r1 + r2) ; r1, r2 ∈ R and r1 ≤ s1 and r2 ≤ s2}
(∗)
sup {f(r1) + f(r2) ; r1, r2 ∈ R and r1 ≤ s1 and r2 ≤ s2}
= sup {f(r1) ; r1 ∈ R and r1 ≤ s1}+ sup {f(r2) ; r2 ∈ R and r2 ≤ s2}
= f(s1) + f(s2),
as desired. Here, (∗) is because f is a homomorphism. The proof for f is similar.
3 Claim 2
Claim 3: f(s) = f(s) for all s ∈ R, and f(r) = f(r) = f(r) for all r ∈ R.
Proof: (by contradiction) Clearly f(r)− f(r) ≥ 0 for all r ∈ R. Suppose f(s)− f(s) =
ǫ > 0 for some s ∈ R. Then f(s + r) − f(s + r) ≥ ǫ for all r ∈ R, by Claim 2. But
R is dense by hypothesis; thus, f has a dense set of ǫ-sized jump discontinuities. But
this is impossible, because f is nondecreasing.
It follows that f(s) = f(s) for all s ∈ R. From the definition, it is clear that f(r) =
f(r) = f(r) for all r ∈ R. 3 Claim 3
Thus, we have extended f to a nondecreasing group homomorphism from R to R. At
this point, a well-known result about solutions to the Cauchy functional equation implies
that f is multiplication by a positive scalar. 2
Proof of Example C.2. Recall that 〈Bx,y〉 is the smallest divisible subgroup of Z〈V〉 which
contains Bx,y.
Claim 1: 〈Bx,y〉 = {z ∈ Z〈V〉; ∃ n ∈ N and b1, . . . ,bN ,b′1, . . . ,b
′
M ∈ Bx,y such that
n z = (b1 + · · ·+ bN)− (b
′
1 + · · ·+ b
′
M)}.
Proof: Let Z denote the set defined on the right hand side. Clearly, Bx,y ⊆ Z. Also, it
is easy to see that Z is a divisible subgroup of Z〈V〉. Thus, 〈Bx,y〉 ⊆ Z.
Conversely, Bx,y ⊆ 〈Bx,y〉, and 〈Bx,y〉 is closed under addition, so b1+ · · ·+bN − (b
′
1+
· · ·+b′M) ∈ 〈Bx,y〉 for all b1, . . . ,bN ,b
′
1, . . . ,b
′
M ∈ Bx,y. Also, 〈Bx,y〉 is divisible; thus,
Z ⊆ 〈Bx,y〉. 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: 〈Bx,y〉 ⊆ Px,y.
Proof: Let a ∈ 〈Bx,y〉. Claim 1 yields some n ∈ N such that n a = (b1+b2+ · · ·+bN)−
(b′1+b
′
2+· · ·+b
′
M), for some b1, . . . ,bN ,b
′
1, . . . ,b
′
M ∈ Bx,y. But (b1+· · ·+bN) ∈ Bx,y
and (b′1 + · · · + b
′
M) ∈ Bx,y, because Bx,y is additively closed (because Cx and Cy are
additively closed, because F satisfies reinforcement). Thus, n a ∈ Bx,y − Bx,y. But
Bx,y ⊆ Cx, and Bx,y ⊆ Cy; thus, n a ∈ Cx − Cy. Thus, a ∈ Px,y. 3 Claim 2
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Since Px,y is additively closed, Claim 2 implies that Px,y is a union of cosets of 〈Bx,y〉.
Likewise Py,x is a union of cosets of 〈Bx,y〉.
Let Q := Z〈V〉/〈Bx,y〉. By hypothesis, we can regard Q as a subgroup of Q. Without loss
of generality, rescale Q so that Z ⊆ Q. Let Q+ := {q ∈ Q; q ≥ 0} and Q− := {q ∈ Q;
q ≤ 0}.
Claim 3: If P ⊂ Q is a cone containing 0, then either P = {0} or P = Q or P = Q+
or P = Q−.
Proof: If P 6= {0}, then P contains some p 6= 0. Either p > 0 or p < 0. Suppose p > 0.
Now, p ∈ Q, so there exists some n ∈ N such that n p ∈ N. But n p ∈ P also, and
P is divisible; thus 1 ∈ P. Thus, N ⊆ P, since P is additively closed. Now, for any
q ∈ Q+, there is some m ∈ N such that mq ∈ N; thus, q ∈ P, because P is divisible.
We conclude: if P contains any p > 0, then Q+ ⊆ P. Likewise, if P contains any
p < 0, then Q− ⊆ P. The claim follows. 3 Claim 3
Let φ : Z〈V〉−→Q be the quotient map.
Claim 4: φ(Px,y) is a cone in Q.
Proof: φ(Px,y) is additively closed because Px,y is additively closed, and φ is a homo-
morphism. It remains to show that φ(Px,y) is divisible.
Let q ∈ Q and n ∈ N, and suppose n q ∈ φ(Px,y). Now, q = φ(z) for some z ∈ Z〈V〉.
Thus, we have φ(n z) = nφ(z) = n q ∈ φ(Px,y). Thus, n z ∈ φ
−1(φ(Px,y)). But Px,y is
a union of cosets of 〈Bx,y〉, so φ
−1(φ(Px,y)) = Px,y. Thus, n z ∈ Px,y. Thus, z ∈ Px,y,
because Px,y is divisible. Thus, q = φ(z) ∈ φ(Px,y), as desired. 3 Claim 4
By hypothesis, (Cx ∪ Cy) 6⊆ 〈Bx,y〉. Since (Cx ∪ Cy) ⊆ (Cx − Cy) ⊆ Px,y this implies
that φ(Px,y) 6= {0}. Thus Claims 3 and 4 together imply that either φ(Px,y) = Q or
φ(Px,y) = Q
+ or φ(Px,y) = Q
−.
If φ(Px,y) = Q
+, then φ(Py,x) = −Q
− Thus, φ(Px,y ∪ Py,x) = Q
+ ∪ Q− = Q. Thus,
φ−1[φ(Px,y ∪Py,x)] = φ
−1(Q) = Z〈V〉. But Px,y and Py,x are unions of cosets of 〈Bx,y〉, so
this implies that Px,y ∪ Py,x = Z〈V〉, as desired.
Likewise, if φ(Px,y) = −Q
− or Q, then Px,y ∪ Py,x = Z〈V〉. 2
Proof of Proposition C.3. For all x, y ∈ X , let Px,y, Ox,y and b
x,y : Z〈V〉−→Rx,y :=
Z〈V〉/Ox,y be as in the proof of Lemma B.1.
(a) Let x, y ∈ X , and suppose x ≍
F
y. Then Px,y is a complete preorder conoid on Z〈V〉. Thus,
if we apply Lemma A.1(b), then the order on the resulting group Rx,y is already a linear
order (so there is no need to apply the Homogeneous Szpilrajn Lemma).
Now, for any cx ∈ Cx and cy ∈ Cy, we must have b˜
x,y(cx) ≥ 0 ≥ b˜
x,y(cy), and thus,
b˜x,y(cx − cy) ≥ 0. Thus, b˜
x,y(p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ Px,y. In particular, b˜
x,y(o) = 0 for all
o ∈ Ox,y. Thus, ker(b
x,y) ⊆ ker(b˜x,y). Thus, the Third Isomorphism Theorem (Dummit
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and Foote, 2004, Theorem 19, §3.3) yields a group homomorphism α : Rx,y−→R˜x,y such
that b˜x,y = α ◦ bx,y.
It remains to show that α is order-preserving. To see this, let r ∈ Rx,y; then r = b
x,y(z)
for some z ∈ Z〈V〉. If r ≥ 0, then z ∈ Px,y. Thus, b˜x,y(p) ≥ 0, as observed above. But
b˜x,y(p) = α ◦ bx,y(z) = α(r). Thus, α(r) ≥ 0.
This holds for all r ∈ Rx,y; thus, α is an order-preserving homomorphism, so b˜
x,y is a
rescaling of bx,y.
(b) Suppose that x ≈
B
y, and let α : Rx,y−→R˜x,y be the order-preserving homomorphism
constructed in part (a). We must show that α is strictly order preserving.
Claim 1: For all q ∈ Qx,y, we have b˜
x,y(q) > 0.
Proof: If q ∈ Qx,y, then q = gx− cy, for some gx ∈ Gx,y and cy ∈ Cy. Thus, gx 6∈ Cy, but
by,z(gx) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ X (y) \ {x} Then b˜
y,z(gx) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ X (y) \ {x} (because
part (a) says that b˜y,z is a rescaling of by,z). Thus, if b˜x,y(gx) = 0, then y ∈ FeB(gx)
(because B˜ is fine), contradicting the fact that gx ∈ Cx \ Cy. Thus, we must have
b˜x,y(gx) > 0.
Meanwhile, b˜x,y(cy) ≤ 0, because cy ∈ Cy. Thus, b˜
x,y(q) = b˜x,y(gx) − b˜
x,y(cy) > 0.
3 Claim 1
Let r ∈ Rx,y; then r = b
x,y(z) for some z ∈ Z〈V〉. Suppose r > 0; we must show that
α(r) > 0.
If x ≈
B
y, then Z〈V〉 = Ox,y∪Qx,y⊔Qy,x; thus, either z ∈ Ox,y or z ∈ Qx,y or z ∈ Qy,x. But
if z ∈ Ox,y, then r = 0. Thus, if r > 0, then z 6∈ Ox,y. Also, if z ∈ Qy,x, then z ∈ Py,x,
so r ≤ 0. Thus, if r > 0, then z 6∈ Qy,x, either. Thus, we must have z ∈ Qx,y. But then
Claim 1(a) says that b˜x,y(z) > 0. But b˜x,y = α ◦ bx,y,so this means that α(bx,y(z)) > 0,
which means α(r) > 0.
This holds for all r ∈ Rx,y; we conclude that α is strictly order-preserving, which means
b˜x,y is a strict rescaling of bx,y.
(c) follows immediately from part (b). 2
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